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Chairman’s Foreword 
Trees are an iconic part of our landscape. Many are long-lived, representing long-term 
investments that provide environmental, social and economic benefits that are realised 
over several human generations. Our trees provide direct economic benefits from timber 
and wood products for the construction, furniture, paper and biomass industries. They 
have immense recreational, amenity and aesthetic value in countryside, towns and cities. 
Trees are also an integral part of ecosystems, supporting biodiversity and resilience and 
promoting stability in natural and semi-natural woodlands. They absorb pollutants, protect 
water quality and sequester carbon which helps mitigate climate change.  
Trees are also susceptible to attack by pests and pathogens. Some of these can spread 
quickly over large areas causing rapid death or decline of trees. The problems are 
exemplified by the recent incursion of Chalara into the UK, following spread across the 
European continent, where the pathogen killed many ash trees. The devastating effects of 
an earlier epidemic involving Dutch elm disease during the 1970s are still evident in the 
UK landscape. New diseases, such as acute oak decline and ramorum disease on larch, 
are already here and spreading. Others, such as chestnut blight, are known to be 
approaching the UK as they enter and become established in nearby countries.  
The numbers of new tree pests and diseases recorded in the UK are increasing. The UK 
needs to be better prepared in understanding the risks of what pests and diseases are 
likely to arrive, when, where and how they might invade, how severe the impact is likely to 
be and what options are available for interception, eradication, mitigation or adaptation. 
This Taskforce was established by the Defra Chief Scientific Adviser, Professor Ian Boyd, 
in order to consider these issues and to make recommendations about how the UK should 
protect tree health and strengthen plant biosecurity.  
The Taskforce has undertaken an intensive review of current threats and practices, 
publishing an interim report in December 2012 in which we presented our initial 
recommendations together with a list of crucial knowledge gaps. Building upon feedback 
from the wide stakeholder community, and additional reviews of national and international 
practice, the Taskforce now presents the final report. The supporting evidence for each 
recommendation has been carefully reviewed, as has the tractability for practical 
implementation of the recommendations. Knowledge gaps have also been reviewed in 
relation to policy and implementation needs, as has the information on pest and pathogen 
threats.  
Our recommendations address what the UK can do in the national and international 
context. The recommendations range from the development of a Plant Health Risk 
Register in order to identify and prioritise the main risks, through implementation of 
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procedures for preparedness and contingency planning, to strengthening biosecurity at the 
borders and to minimising the impacts of pests and disease within the UK. We also 
address governance and leadership for strategic and tactical responses to pest and 
disease threats. The report proposes the roles to be played by Government, industry, 
other stakeholders and the public. We consider how to improve communication using 
modern, user-friendly methods to provide quick and intelligent access to information and 
we identify skills shortages. While it is clear that some investment will be necessary, if we 
are to protect the long-term health and investment in our trees, some changes can be 
achieved by doing things differently, making use of modern technology for diagnostics, 
predictive modelling and information sharing. 
The remit for the Taskforce was expressly directed at trees and related woody species but 
it is clear that plant biosecurity encompasses pests and diseases of other plants. These 
include agricultural and horticultural food crops, biomass crops, indigenous vegetation and 
ornamentals. The withdrawal of widely used fungicides and pesticides and the failure of 
others due to selection for resistance amongst pests and pathogens are increasing the 
risks of crop loss. The effectiveness of some forms of genetic resistance are also under 
threat. These are exemplified by the risks of significant crop losses from the rapid, 
continental-scale spread of new virulent strains of wheat stem rust and yellow rust that are 
capable of infecting previously resistant crop varieties. Many of the actions that underpin 
our recommendations for tree health could be readily extended to include a wide range of 
plant species. 
I gratefully acknowledge the dedicated work and generosity of time, given by members of 
the Taskforce in meeting and in producing both the interim report and this final report in a 
short period. The Taskforce undoubtedly benefited from the broad and valuable input on 
current practice of various stakeholder organisations, as well as from an advisory group of 
officials, with membership drawn from Defra, the Forestry Commission and the Defra 
Network organisations. I am also grateful to Border Force officials for advice on border 
issues and to the UK Chief Veterinary Officer and his colleagues who provided valuable 
insight and lessons from their experience of preparing for and tackling animal disease 
outbreaks. Finally, I would like to thank the government officials who have supported the 
work of the Taskforce and Professor Ian Boyd, for his insight and support. 
 
 
 
Professor Chris Gilligan  
Professor of Mathematical Biology and Head of the School of Biological Sciences 
University of Cambridge  
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I. Executive Summary 
Background 
Plants are vital, yet often taken for granted. They contribute significantly to our natural 
environment and social wellbeing, as well as to the productivity and competitiveness of 
several commercial sectors. In the last few years, several new and/or previously 
unrecognised pests and pathogens have emerged as significant risks to the UK’s crops 
and other plants, including trees in woodlands, commercial forests and in the urban 
environment. These threats have increased with globalisation in trade and travel and the 
resulting escalation in volume and diversity of plants and plant products entering the UK1. 
This, in turn, has led to a build-up in the number of harmful plant pests and pathogens. 
The changing frequency of extreme weather events may also result in new pest and 
pathogen threats and may also amplify the impacts of those already here2. Once they 
become established, pests and pathogens can cause a wide range of adverse impacts on 
landscapes and biodiversity, timber and crop production and, in certain circumstances, 
human health. Responding to this mounting pressure is a challenge facing public and 
private landowners, farmers, foresters, local authorities, Government services and non-
governmental organisations.  
Given this background, Defra’s Secretary of State asked the Chief Scientific Adviser to 
Defra, Professor Ian Boyd, to establish an independent, expert Taskforce to provide advice 
on threats from pests and pathogens and to recommend how to protect the UK from those 
threats. The Taskforce published an interim report on 6th December 2012 with eight 
recommendations and a list of knowledge gaps. Building upon feedback on the interim 
report from the wide stakeholder community, the Taskforce reviewed the evidence base 
and the likely costs, benefits and practicality of implementation for each recommendation. 
The conclusions presented in this final report take account of additional reviews of current 
national and international practice. Our conclusions also benefit from input and 
engagement with stakeholders, an advisory group of officials with membership drawn from 
Defra, the Forestry Commission and the Defra Network organisations, advice from Border 
Force officials, and from independent peer review. 
                                            
1 Brasier, C.M. (2008). The biosecurity threat to the UK and global environment from international trade in 
plants. Plant Pathology 57 (5), 792-808. 
2 Garrett, K.A., Forbes, G. A., Savary, S., Skelsey, P., Sparks, A. H., Valdivia, C., van Bruggen, A. H. C., 
Willocquet, L., Djurle, A, Duveiller, E., Eckersten, H., Pande, S., Vera Cruz, C. and Yuen, J. (2011). 
Complexity in climate-change impacts: an analytical framework for effects mediated by plant disease, Plant 
Pathology 60 (1) 15-30. 
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Key Recommendations 
 
A. National Context 
• Develop a prioritised UK Plant Health Risk Register. 
• Appoint a Chief Plant Health Officer to own the UK Plant Health Risk 
Register and to provide strategic and tactical leadership for managing those 
risks. 
• Develop and implement procedures for preparedness and contingency 
planning to predict, monitor, and control the spread of pests and pathogens. 
• Review, simplify, and strengthen governance and legislation. 
B. International Context 
• Improve the use of epidemiological intelligence from EU/other regions and 
work to improve the EU regulations concerned with tree health and plant 
biosecurity. 
• Strengthen biosecurity to reduce risks at the border and within the UK. 
C. Capabilities and Communication 
• Develop a modern, user-friendly system to provide quick and intelligent 
access to information about tree health and plant biosecurity. 
• Address key skills shortages. 
 
The Taskforce considered the current threats to tree health and, how, when and why 
future threats are likely to arise, and what current protocols are in place to detect, prepare 
for and respond to pest and disease outbreaks. The evidence shows that tree health in the 
UK continues to be at significant risk from pests and diseases. Some pests and pathogens 
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have arrived recently and are becoming established. Others are present and spreading in 
EU member states, posing risks to the UK from entry by trade or other means of dispersal; 
while risks also arise from inadvertent transmission either directly into the UK or indirectly 
via countries from beyond the EU3.  
The Taskforce concluded that current arrangements are not satisfactory and action needs 
to be taken if tree health and plant biosecurity are to be improved. Some investment will be 
necessary but the advantages of minimising environmental, social and economic impacts 
from pests and disease will be considerable. Moreover, the recommendations are 
designed to improve the effectiveness of current resources by raising awareness of the 
need for biosecurity amongst Government, stakeholders4, and the public. Further 
efficiencies accrue by making greater use of modern technology, including modelling, 
surveillance and diagnostics, by making better use of current legislation and by directing 
efforts according to risk-based assessments of threats to plant biosecurity.  
The Taskforce observed that there are numerous risk assessments for individual pests 
and pathogens at both the national and European levels but concluded there should be a 
single national Plant Health Risk Register. The purpose of the risk register is to identify 
and prioritise the risks of those pests and pathogens that pose the greatest threat, 
including the probability of entry of exotics or the occurrence of new strains of indigenous 
species. The risk register should take account of pathways of entry and establishment, 
including private and commercial import, introductions by air, soil, timber, seeds, saplings, 
and by other means such as plant parts and wood packaging. The risk register should also 
include endemic pests and pathogens that continue to pose serious threats to tree health. 
Horizon scanning, with wider stakeholder involvement, is an essential component of the 
process. The risk register would inform choices and policy options, as well as identifying 
how best to deploy resources most effectively to manage a range of threats. 
The Taskforce highlighted the need for a Chief Plant Health Officer, at a senior level, to be 
responsible for owning key risks and managing outbreaks. The Chief Plant Health Officer 
would be responsible for preparedness and contingency planning: measures should 
include methods for detection and diagnosis, efficient epidemiological surveillance to 
detect early incursions, and pest and pathogen modelling. Models for known threats 
should be developed in advance while generic models should be available to prepare for 
novel threats. There is scope for sharing of epidemiological models amongst EU member 
 
3 Newly arrived or recently established threats include acute oak decline, ramorum disease of larch, 
Dothistroma needle blight of pine, ash dieback and oak processionary moth. Pests and pathogens currently 
established and spreading in EU member states include Asian and citrus longhorned beetles, each with wide 
host ranges, red oak borer, chestnut blight, zigzag elm sawfly and pine pitch canker. Major threats from non-
EU countries include emerald ash borer, spruce budworm and sweet chestnut gall wasp, oak wilt and plane 
wilt. 
4 Stakeholders include non-Governmental organisations, industry, and landowners (both public and private). 
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states for prediction and analysis of pest and disease spread and comparison of mitigation 
and control strategies.  
Contingency plans should be developed and agreed with stakeholders ahead of 
incursions. These plans should clearly define the roles of those organisations involved with 
outbreak response, including the process of communicating with stakeholders. 
The Taskforce does not consider that the current legislative and governance arrangements 
are satisfactory. Responsibility for plant health within and amongst the statutory authorities 
should be reviewed in order to create a coherent strategy for identification and 
management of the key threats across the whole of the UK. The Plant Health Act 1967 
should be reviewed and updated to include all plants, and rendered consistent with other 
plant/tree protection legislation.  
To minimise the risks of pest and pathogen incursions, control measures should be 
tightened through more proactive use of existing legislative mechanisms by both the UK 
and by other EU Member States; for example, by seeking protected zone status5 before 
rather than after a pest or pathogen arrives in the UK. Businesses that import, or cultivate 
imported trees and other plants, should take significantly more responsibility for 
biosecurity, for example, by assuring the provenance of both the plants and associated 
soils from their suppliers. 
There should be promotion of greater awareness of risks posed by plant pests and 
diseases amongst stakeholders and the public. The Taskforce proposes that no plant 
material for personal use be imported from outside the EU.  
The Plant Passport scheme should be strengthened and also applied to seed as a means 
of ensuring greater traceability. Changes to EU legislation should be pursued to ensure the 
Plant Passport scheme is run in conjunction with an industry-led certification scheme so 
that the key stakeholders are part of the system that ensures good plant health status. 
Trade, involving new products or a new country of origin outside the EU, should not take 
place until an appropriate UK risk assessment has been conducted by the 
industry/importer. 
Improved biosecurity arrangements provide an opportunity for growth in trade of healthy 
plant material and plant products for the UK and other partners. Greater attention to 
biosecurity could also renew interest in the local production of trees for woodland and 
amenity planting and the use of natural regeneration, where site conditions and woodland 
objectives allow. 
 
5  A zone in the EU, recognised in EU legislation, in which (i) a quarantine pest, which is established in other 
parts of the EU, is not established in that particular zone, despite favourable conditions for it to occur there, 
(ii) there is a risk that a pest that is not present in the EU may become established because of favourable 
conditions which are limited to that zone. 
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The Taskforce also recommends the development and use of efficient web-based 
interactive tools to facilitate access to information to enable effective risk-based decisions 
to be made, and to share up to date information with stakeholders. There are also 
opportunities for the public to contribute to the collection of data on plants and plant health.  
The Taskforce noted with concern certain skill gaps. There has been an erosion in the UK 
and elsewhere of certain crucial field- and research-based expertise necessary to ensure 
tree health and plant biosecurity. 
Knowledge Gaps 
The Taskforce focused attention on knowledge gaps likely to impact on the ability to 
implement the recommendations. Particular attention was paid to scientific, technological, 
logistical, social and political issues. Knowledge gaps were identified in epidemiology, 
surveying and surveillance, detection, mitigation and adaptation strategies, social science, 
trade patterns, and environmental change. The Taskforce noted that the initiative on Tree 
Health and Plant Biosecurity6, coordinated by Living with Environmental Change, provides 
a welcome opportunity to fill some of the key knowledge gaps. However, the Taskforce 
urged action to halt the decline of natural and social science expertise and to build 
capacity to address the full range of evidence needs required for actions to protect plant 
health.  
Next Steps 
This report represents the conclusion of the work of the Taskforce for the Chief Scientific 
Adviser to Defra. Government and the stakeholder community will need to consider the 
package of interdependent recommendations and set out actions in response to 
strengthen the regime supporting tree health and plant biosecurity. The Taskforce noted 
that as a helpful first step Defra’s Tree Health and Plant Biosecurity Evidence Plan7 has 
been adapted to take account of the Interim Report8 from the Taskforce. To address all of 
the recommendations, concerted partnership actions by Defra, the Devolved 
Administrations and a wide range of stakeholders will be required to protect plant health. A 
review of progress against the recommendations after a year would be an important step 
to assess impact and direction of travel.  
 
6 www.lwec.org.uk/stories/tree-health-and-plant-biosecurity-initiative  
7www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/181846/pb13929-evidenceplan-tree-
health-plant-biosecurity.pdf.pdf 
8www.defra.gov.uk/publications/2012/12/06/pb13842-tree-taskforce-interim/ 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/tree-health-and-plant-biosecurity-expert-taskforce-interim-report 
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II. Background 
The UK Government has made a long-term commitment to addressing threats to tree 
health and plant biosecurity. The need to address these threats has taken on additional 
urgency because of the 2012 discovery of the fungal infection Chalara fraxinea 
(Hymenoscyphus pseudoalbidus) in native ash trees in the UK. The progression of 
Chalara illustrates the vulnerability of plants in the UK to pests and pathogens transmitted 
from mainland Europe. There is also a heightened risk of importation of pests and 
pathogens from other parts of the world. A new variant of Dutch elm disease arrived in the 
UK in the late 1960s resulting in almost complete loss of mature elms from the British 
countryside9. A number of other pests and pathogens have followed10. Some of these are 
changing the structure of woodlands and threatening the environmental, social and 
economic value of trees. The Taskforce was established by Defra’s Chief Scientific 
Adviser to consider these issues and to make recommendations on how the UK should 
strengthen its responsiveness and preparedness in order to strengthen plant biosecurity 
and support tree health. 
Threats to tree and plant health 
There has been an increase in the rate at which harmful tree and plant pests and 
pathogens are becoming established in the UK (see Annex A). This is due to changing 
trade and movement patterns, possibly exacerbated by extreme weather events11 and by 
evolutionary changes to pests and pathogens. These pests and pathogens can cause a 
wide range of adverse impacts on landscapes and biodiversity, timber and crop 
production, the economy and, in certain circumstances, human health12.  
Several new or previously unrecognised pests and pathogens have emerged as significant 
risks in the last few years. Threats to tree and plant health have increased with 
globalisation; and financial pressures on UK nurseries have led many to reduce costs by 
                                            
9 Potter, C, Harwood, T, Knight, J and Tomlinson, I (2011). Learning from history, predicting the future: The 
Dutch Elm Disease Outbreak in relation to contemporary tree disease threats. Philosophical Transactions of 
the Royal Society 366:1966-1974.  
10 www.forestry.gov.uk/forestry/infd-6abl5v 
11 www.forestry.gov.uk/pdf/FCRN201.pdf/$file/FCRN201.pdf. Cole, H., Dinon, H., Megalos, M. and Temple, 
C. (2013). 
Healthy Forest, Managing for Resilience. North Carolina State University Cooperative Extension. Information 
Sheet   AG 772. www.ces.ncsu.edu/forestry/pdf/ag/ag772.pdf  
12 For example, oak processionary moth is a risk to human health. The larvae (caterpillars) are covered in 
hairs that contain a toxin and contact with these hairs, or their inhalation, can result in skin irritation and 
allergic reactions. These problems are particularly significant because oak processionary is often most 
abundant on urban trees, along forest edges and in amenity woodlands. 
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purchasing or growing stock overseas13. Subsequently, there has been a marked increase 
in the volume and diversity of plants and plant products entering the UK. UK imports of live 
plants, foliage, branches, and other plant parts have increased by 71% since 199914. In 
1996, the import value of the trade in live plants was £113M (£157M in 2011 prices). This 
has increased to £287M in 2011, a real rise of 83% in 15 years (data from HMRC trade 
statistics). With this, comes an increased likelihood of plant pests and pathogens being 
introduced, spreading through gardens, crops, and woodlands and potentially causing 
serious damage to our native flora or commercial crops. An increasing number of 
outbreaks in the UK have highlighted these threats (Annex A); for example, Phytophthora 
ramorum and P. kernoviae affecting woodland trees, heathland plants and trees in 
heritage gardens. Other recent examples include horse chestnut leaf mining moth 
(Cameraria ohridella), oak processionary moth (Thaumetopoea processionea), bleeding 
canker of horse chestnut (Pseudomonas syringae pv. aesculi)15, and Dothistroma needle 
blight on pines. 
Native, or alien, pests and pathogens that cause minor damage sometimes change their 
behaviour and become more damaging. This may result from changes in climate, pollution, 
land use, or host distribution, or by evolutionary changes in the pest or pathogen 
populations. For example, Phytophthora alni16 (alder phytophthora) is a hybrid species that 
is affecting alder in riparian ecosystems (a host not seriously affected by either parent 
species)17. Although not arising directly from a new introduction, such diseases 
nonetheless need a co-ordinated response. 
Trees have a significant place in our rural and urban landscapes and make a vital 
contribution to our rural economy, heritage, and wellbeing18. The National Ecosystem 
Assessment highlighted the significant contribution of trees, forests and woodland 
ecosystem services essential to society, as well as through direct economic value and 
social amenity19. The UK has an estimated 3 million hectares of woodland (13% of land 
 
13 Galloway, A.F. (2013). An overview of the U.K. horticultural market and how influences have affected 
worldwide industry. Available at https://sites.google.com/site/aghorticulture1/3-global-horticulture 
14 HM Revenue and Customs data: www.uktradeinfo.com 
15 www.forestry.gov.uk/forestry/infd-6abl5v 
16 Ersek T. and Nagy ZA, (2008). Species hybrids in the genus Phytophthora with emphasis on the alder 
pathogen Phytophthora alni: a review. European Journal of Plant Pathology 122:31-39. 
Bearchell SJ, Fraaije BA, Shaw MW, Fitt BDL, (2005). Wheat archive links long-term fungal pathogen 
population dynamics to air pollution. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA 102: 
5438-42. 
17 Brasier, C. M., Kirk, S. A., Delcan, J., Cooke, D. L., Jung, T. and Man in’t Veld, W. (2004). Phytophthora 
alni sp. nov. and its variants: designation of a group of emerging heteroploid hybrid pathogens. Mycological 
Research 108:1172–1184. 
18 Office of National statistics (measures for wellbeing): www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171766_272242.pdf  
19 UK National Ecosystem Assessment: http://uknea.unep-wcmc.org; and    
www.defra.gov.uk/environment/natural/uknea/    
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area) contributing ca. £1.7 billion Gross Value Added in 201020 to the economy through 
wood processing (£1.4 billion) and forestry (£0.33 billion). In addition, there is estimated to 
be a further ~£1.8 billion21 (2012 prices) per year of non-market benefits (from recreation, 
biodiversity, landscape, air pollution absorption, protection of water quality, and from 
carbon sequestration to help mitigate climate change)22.  
The importance of tree health to people in Britain is underlined by the strong cultural 
values associated with the countryside and rural spaces, and the cultural, affective, and 
symbolic meanings of woods and trees for very many people in Britain23. The significant 
response of the public and the media to the Chalara outbreak illustrates how threats to 
tree and plant biosecurity hold the potential to drive very significant social and institutional 
mobilisation and controversy, with effects that go far beyond any direct impacts of the 
physical risk itself24.  
Pests and pathogens can also cause serious economic losses in arable and horticultural 
crops. The total value of UK crop output in 2010 (excluding forestry) was about £7.5 billion. 
As arable crops and most other commercial crops are intensively managed and harvested 
regularly, the identification of outbreaks of new pests and pathogens and responses to 
them is usually early and rapid. There is also a range of tools available for effective 
management of pests and pathogens, and rapid genetic change in the crops is possible by 
conventional breeding methods. However, in the case of trees, which are long-lived and 
not closely managed it can be years before an infection or infestation becomes obvious, by 
which time effective mitigation action may be far more difficult and expensive. This is also 
true for short life-cycle species that are not being actively managed and for those that are 
a part of semi-natural ecosystems such as heathland.  
Tree Health and Plant Biosecurity Expert Taskforce 
Responding to this mounting pressure on our tree and other plant populations challenges 
both public and private landowners, Government services and non-governmental 
organisations. Defra’s Secretary of State asked the Chief Scientific Adviser to Defra, 
 
20 Forest Statistics 2012:  
www.forestry.gov.uk/pdf/ForestryStatistics2012.pdf/$FILE/ForestryStatistics2012.pdf (N.B this national value 
figure has low precision. 
21 Christie M, Hanley N and Hynes S (2007). Valuing enhancements to forest recreation using choice 
experiment and contingent behaviour methods. Journal of Forest Economics, 13 (2-3), 75-102. 
22 www.forestry.gov.uk/pdf/sebreport0703.pdf/$file/sebreport0703.pdf 
23 Henwood, K.L. and Pidgeon, N.F. (2001). Talk about woods and trees: threat of urbanization, stability, and 
biodiversity. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 21, 125-147. Also, Stewart, A. and O’Brien, L. (2010). 
Inventory of social evidence and practical programmes relating to trees, woods and forests and urban/peri-
urban regeneration, place-making and place-shaping. Forest Research, Edinburgh. 
24 Pidgeon, N. and Barnett, J. (2013). Chalara and the Social Amplification of Risk: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/policy-advisory-groups/tree-health-and-plant-biosecurity-expert-taskforce 
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Professor Ian Boyd, to establish an independent, expert Taskforce to advise on the current 
threats to trees and woody hosts from pests and pathogens and to make 
recommendations about how those threats could be addressed. The aims of the Taskforce 
are summarised below and repeated in Annex B for ease of reference: 
• To review domestic and international risks presented from new and emerging tree and 
related plant25 pests and pathogens, including using best available evidence, 
assessment of risk status, and appropriate risk assessment tools. 
• To provide an independent perspective on costs and benefits to inform priority setting 
and resource allocation26. 
• To identify potential obstacles to removing barriers to improve tree health and plant 
biosecurity, and suggest ways of resolving them. 
• To make use of international best practice in tree health and plant biosecurity 
management. 
• To produce a rapid evidence assessment and make recommendations for next steps 
including identifying crucial knowledge gaps. 
• To consider whether the current plant health policy and delivery infrastructure and risk 
mitigation framework needs to be overhauled and make recommendations for change, 
if required. 
• To review the current contingency planning and emergency response arrangements 
and recommend changes, if required. 
Each Taskforce recommendation is prefaced by a brief explanation of why the 
recommendation is necessary, followed by a short explanation of what would be required 
to support the recommendation. The report also summarises how the Taskforce worked 
and who was convened to support the work of the Taskforce.  
 
25 The Taskforce was requested to consider tree health and related biosecurity in the UK. This includes trees 
in woodlands, forests and in the wider environment, including amenity, fruit, and urban trees. Woody shrubs 
associated with trees and green spaces, are relevant as either a pathway of introduction/spread of serious 
pest and pathogen threats, or where they act as sources of infection or infestation of trees (LWEC, 2011). 
Available at Securing Tree Health in a Changing Environment. 
26 The Taskforce considered likely broad costs and benefits in order to ensure that each recommendation 
and the actions arising from them were tractable and likely to be in society's best interests. Detailed cost-
benefit analyses were beyond the scope of the review since these will depend upon the precise ways in 
which the Government and other stakeholders deliver the recommendations. The Taskforce discussions 
were informed by Chalara in Ash Trees: A framework for assessing ecosystem impacts and appraising 
options: https://www.gov.uk/government/policy-advisory-groups/tree-health-and-plant-biosecurity-expert-
taskforce.  
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III. The Approach Taken by the Taskforce 
The Taskforce comprised experts in a wide range of relevant fields. The Taskforce was 
chaired by Professor Chris Gilligan, Professor of Mathematical Biology and Head of the 
School of Biological Sciences, University of Cambridge.  
The Taskforce was convened and met as a group, but also in subgroups, a number of 
times over the period November 2012 to March 2013 (see Annex B). A combination of 
small groups feeding into plenary discussions ensured that all members of the Taskforce 
had a common grounding in the evidence. The Taskforce focused on trees and woody 
species, as specified by the terms of reference, but noted that the principles addressed in 
the recommendations would have broader applicability to pests and pathogens of other 
plant species, as summarised in the Chairman’s foreword. Expert opinion was sought 
about the risks posed by pests and pathogens and the principles that should be used to 
prioritise and address these risks. The Taskforce also considered current and emerging 
knowledge gaps. 
Whilst the main Taskforce meetings provided an opportunity for Taskforce members to 
deliberate the key issues amongst themselves, an Officials Advisory Group (see Annex C 
for Terms of Reference) was also convened to work both with and alongside the Taskforce 
to provide input and to ensure the recommendations were feasible. Subgroups allowed 
Taskforce members to examine key evidence issues and further refine the 
recommendations. Each subgroup was chaired by a member of the Taskforce to ensure 
independence but, importantly, subgroups also included members of the Officials Advisory 
Group. The main meetings included open sessions between Taskforce members and the 
Officials Advisory Group and closed sessions for the Taskforce members alone. 
The Taskforce undertook an initial broad review of the problems and potential solutions, 
leading to the establishment of a series of recommendations to Government. Comments 
and input from the Officials Advisory Group and other key stakeholders were incorporated, 
and the initial recommendations were subject to external peer review. This led to the 
publication of an interim report in December 201227. The Taskforce subsequently 
undertook further work to ensure thorough analysis of the recommendations, reviewing the 
evidence underpinning each recommendation. At this point, the Taskforce also reviewed 
issues on practicality and manageability for each of the recommendations and identified 
essential actions required to implement each recommendation. In considering the 
feasibility of recommendations, the Taskforce took advice from the Officials Advisory 
                                            
27http://www.defra.gov.uk/publications/files/pb13842-tree-taskforce-interim-121206.pdf.  
Note original site now ported to following site: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/69619/pb13842-tree-
taskforce-interim-121206.pdf. 
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Group, expert peer reviewers (see Annex D), and key stakeholders who were invited to 
provide written comments, and who met with the Taskforce to discuss the 
recommendations28. Written comments provided on the interim report were also 
considered. Where appropriate the final recommendations take account of the advice 
provided by these groups.  
This final report represents the conclusion of the considerations of the Taskforce for the 
Chief Scientific Adviser to Defra, building on the findings set out in the interim report. 
Whilst the main thrust of the Taskforce recommendations remains the same, the 
recommendations have been categorised, refined and re-focused based on further 
consideration of the evidence base. In particular, the Taskforce reviewed national and 
international risks; provided a perspective on costs and benefits; and reviewed 
international best practice in tree health and plant biosecurity management. The Taskforce 
recommendations have been the subject of considerable scrutiny and challenge and 
Defra’s Chief Scientific Adviser has been fully informed and engaged throughout the 
deliberations. The conclusions and recommendations in this report, however, are the sole 
responsibility of the Taskforce members. 
 
28 The Stakeholder Engagement report is at: https://www.gov.uk/government/policy-advisory-groups/tree-
health-and-plant-biosecurity-expert-taskforce 
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IV. Key Recommendations 
A. National Context 
In considering the national context, the Taskforce first addressed what should be done to 
ensure the UK is well placed to manage existing plant pest and pathogen problems, and 
what is needed to enable the UK to respond to new threats. The recommendations cover 
how the UK might identify the key risks, who might be responsible for owning a risk 
register, and how to prepare for outbreaks. The Taskforce also addressed the issue of 
governance. In implementing the recommendations, it will be essential to work closely with 
the Devolved Administrations. The Taskforce is also aware that responsibility for dealing 
with disease outbreaks is currently shared between the Forestry Commission, the 
Devolved Administrations, and Defra (see Annex E for details). Such complexity must not 
get in the way of dealing with plant pests and pathogens, so the Taskforce proposes that 
governance arrangements should be reviewed, strengthened and simplified.  
1. Identifying and Assessing Risk 
The Taskforce observed that there are numerous risk assessments for individual pests 
and pathogens at both the national and EU/EPPO (European and Mediterranean Plant 
Protection Organisation) level but concluded there should be a single national risk register 
for plant health. Building on Defra’s recent work to develop and implement the Tree Health 
and Plant Biosecurity Action Plan29, a new Plant Health Risk Register would serve to 
prioritise risks and guide systematic and proportionate risk management responses, 
including stakeholder engagement. The Taskforce recognised the threat from unknown 
pests and the importance of generic measures to protect against them and strengthen 
resilience across the UK. 
The Taskforce noted that HM Treasury lays down five generic governance principles 
(openness and transparency, wide involvement of stakeholders, proportionate and 
consistent action, the use of evidence, and clear allocation of responsibilities) that 
Government Departments should follow when managing risks30. The Taskforce also 
recognised the importance of using a wide range of methods to take account of 
uncertainties, ambiguities and ignorance in assessing risk31. This approach could help 
                                            
29www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/69330/pb13657-tree-health-
actionplan.pdf 
30 www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/managingrisks_appraisal220705.pdf 
31 Stirling, A. (2010). Keep it complex. Nature. Vol. 468:1029-1031. 
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promote risk management responses that are flexible, adaptive and innovative (in 
accordance with the principle of wide stakeholder engagement in the HM Treasury 
guidance). The development of any risk register needs to be consistent with these 
governance principles. 
The purpose of the Plant Health Risk Register is to identify those pests and pathogens that 
pose the greatest threat, including the probability of entry of exotics or the occurrence of 
new strains of indigenous species; and to identify immediate actions should the threat 
materialise. The risk register should also include endemic pests and pathogens that 
continue to pose serious threats to tree health. The Taskforce recognised the moves by 
the European Commission to focus attention on risks, rather than specific pests, in the 
revision of the EC Plant Health Directive. Risks arise from a combination of harmful agents 
(pests and pathogens), accessible pathways (for example trade movement), and receptor 
systems32. The proposed Plant Health Risk Register should set priorities using the 
combination of these risk factors. Specifically, it should prioritise the pests/pathogens, 
pathways and receptor systems with respect to a number of factors. These include: risk of 
incursion and establishment; the potential for prevention of entry or eradication; the 
mitigation of effects; the impact of incursion in terms of speed and intensity of spread; and 
environmental, social and economic consequences.  
 
 
RECOMMENDATION 1 
Develop a prioritised UK Plant Health Risk Register. 
 
Assessment procedures to populate the Plant Health Risk Register need to incorporate a 
compilation of evidence of risks with an assessment of the quality of the evidence, and 
procedures for the inclusion of expert evidence. Horizon scanning33, with wider 
stakeholder involvement, is an essential component of the process. The Plant Health Risk 
Register would inform choices and policy options, as well as identifying how best to deploy 
resources most effectively for risk assessment and management actions to deal with a 
range of threats. Priorities for action will be determined by the risk combined with the 
availability, feasibility and cost of options for interception, mitigation or adaptation. The 
Plant Health Risk Register would need to be updated on a regular basis (to be determined 
depending on how dynamic the agents, pathways and receptors are). It would also be 
used to identify priorities for research to fill key gaps in the evidence base.  
 
                                            
32 Receptor systems include the location and connectedness of susceptible host populations as well as the 
cultivation systems. 
33 Horizon scanning being the identification of current and future threats and opportunities. 
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The Plant Health Risk Register should take account of a range of factors, including: 
• the type of pest/pathogen agents; 
• pathways of entry and establishment (e.g. commercial import, private import, 
introductions by air, soil, timber, seeds, saplings, and other means such as plant 
parts, wood packaging); 
• the nature of the receptor systems, including the connectedness and distribution of 
susceptible host species;  
• environmental, social and economic impacts; 
• current uncertainties, with the capacity for horizon scanning to identify potential 
future threats; and 
• assessment of the feasibility of management of pest introduction and spread. 
The format of the Plant Health Risk Register is a matter for further discussion but a 
possible template for assessing and prioritising risks taking account of environmental, 
social and economic impacts is set out in Annex F. Building on such a template, potential 
components of a prioritised Plant Health Risk Register could include: 
• assessment of the baseline risk (without mitigation or controls and with likelihood 
and impact quantified as far as possible): 
o likelihood: to include probability of entry and probability of establishment; and 
o impact: to include potential for spread and intensity, effects on economic, 
social and environmental factors; 
• current controls and mitigation; 
• residual risk (after controls and mitigation are implemented), quantified as for the 
baseline risk; and 
• identification of the risk indicators, including pest and pathogen intelligence from 
Europe and other regions (see Recommendation 5), susceptibility of target hosts, 
monitoring of trade and aerial movement of the pest and pathogen: 
o establishment of the acceptable level of risk;  
o further action to refine the risk indicators; and 
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o current risk assessment and requirements for further information to reach 
acceptable levels of confidence. 
The Taskforce did not wish to be overly prescriptive about form and content, and 
recognised that considerable further analysis will be necessary to complete the register 
and enable prioritisation (see also Recommendation 7 and Annex F). 
The pests and pathogens representing the greatest risks should be included on the Defra 
Risk Register and, if appropriate, on the National Risk Assessment34. How risks are added 
to, and removed from, the Plant Health Risk Register should be considered and clear 
protocols derived, including how to use evidence from the Register to inform decisions 
about protected zone status. The Plant Health Risk Register should be a public document 
and consideration should be given to how the risks are communicated effectively to 
multiple stakeholders and the public35. 
2. Chief Plant Health Officer 
The Taskforce highlighted the need for an individual at a senior level to be responsible for 
prioritising and owning key risks and managing outbreaks. This involves adopting a similar 
approach to animal health, including strategic prioritisation of resources, informed by the 
Plant Health Risk Register (see Recommendation 1). In the case of animal health control, 
the Chief Veterinary Officer does not have budget responsibility but there is a clear, and 
well-defined, requirement to adopt a ‘command and control’ role in animal-related 
emergencies. The Taskforce noted the establishment of the UK Plant Health Strategy 
Board, which aims to co-ordinate plant health strategy amongst responsible official bodies 
across the UK, including the Devolved Administrations. The Taskforce concluded that the 
function of the UK Plant Health Strategy Board required further consideration (see also 
Recommendation 4), especially to clarify and strengthen its strategic aims and the 
relationship with the proposed Chief Plant Health Officer.  
 
 
RECOMMENDATION 2 
Appoint a Chief Plant Health Officer to own the UK Plant Health Risk 
Register and to provide strategic and tactical leadership for managing 
those risks. 
 
                                            
34 https://www.gov.uk/risk-assessment-how-the-risk-of-emergencies-in-the-uk-is-assessed 
35 Delivering effective risk communications has to be approached with considerable care, paying close 
attention to both process design and message content. A range of evidence-based guidelines to good 
practice exists, such as Chapter 5 in Risk: Improving Government’s Capability to Handle Risk and 
Uncertainty, 2002, Cabinet Office, HMSO. www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/orange_book.pdf 
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The Taskforce considered a range of possible models for a Chief Plant Health Officer and 
anticipated that the role could work in a manner analogous to, and at the same grade as, 
the Chief Veterinary Officer. While animal health has clear links to public health and 
ensuring safe food, plant health covers a wider range of activity and potential risks36. 
Responsibility for assessing and managing the risks to tree and plant health more 
generally ought to be combined with a centralised role. In the UK context, this will need to 
be organised taking into consideration the requirements and responsibilities of the 
Devolved Administrations. It is likely that the role would encompass responsibilities for 
management of all plant health, subject to future discussion, and would be most effective if 
carried out at a UK-wide level. There are different models for filling this role, for example, 
external recruitment, secondment, or by Civil Service appointment, which is a matter for 
further consideration. 
A Chief Plant Health Officer would have: 
• seniority and credibility, and standing across Government, and the stakeholder and 
academic communities, such that he or she would command authority and ensure 
policy is implemented; 
• equivalence of function and grade to the Chief Veterinary Officer; and 
• authority to vary the Terms of Reference for the UK Plant Health Strategy Board 
and to be the customer for the products of the Board 37. 
The Chief Plant Health Officer should be responsible for planning and preparedness 
including: 
• supervising the initial design of the Plant Health Risk Register; 
• updating the Register, epidemiological intelligence, surveillance and management 
protocols; 
• communicating with Ministers and senior officials and coordination of action across 
the Devolved Administrations (see Recommendation 4) with a key representative 
role at the appropriate European and international level; 
• co-ordinating engagement with the media, industry and stakeholders, long-term 
strategy and horizon scanning and general communication; 
 
36 The host range for plant species, even amongst trees, is much larger than for animals, and the panel of 
pest and disease risks is very large for trees. Surveillance of animal diseases is also assisted by the 
reporting potential of the veterinary profession in the local context. 
37 In line with Recommendation 4 to strengthen the role of the UK Plant Health Strategy Board. 
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• challenging relevant policy and its implementation and co-ordinating activity on 
plant pests and pathogens across Defra policy areas in relation to risk of incursion, 
mitigation and control; 
• contingency plans and emergency response at the UK level; 
• together with Ministers and senior officials, putting in place mechanisms for timely 
access to information and data about plant pests and pathogens from EU Member 
States and beyond; 
• strengthening border controls as appropriate (see Recommendation 6);  
• ensuring the UK is recognised as a responsible exporter of quality trees and plants; 
and 
• identifying and informing priorities for research. 
The Chief Plant Health Officer should also lead the disease response for Defra in the 
event of a major outbreak. 
3. Preventing and preparing for outbreaks 
The Taskforce noted the remarkable efforts that had been made to monitor the infection of 
UK ash trees by Chalara in 2012. With the benefit of hindsight it also considered what 
additional resources would have helped with the response and reduced disruption to work 
related to pre-existing priorities, and what could have been in place to ensure effective 
preparedness. In line with Recommendation 2, future contingency planning and 
preparedness should be the responsibility of the Chief Plant Health Officer. Preparedness 
requires an understanding of the data needs and of the range of possible data sources, as 
well as the capability for rapid analysis of these data sources. Adequate maps and related 
resources for identifying where key susceptible host species are located are required. 
Work by the National Biodiversity Network38, for example, is already collating data in an 
easily accessible form. The National Forest Inventory is currently the main source of data 
on trees in woodland, providing data for risk assessment, modelling and directing site 
inspections39. Data about host distribution in natural and managed environments, 
importers and nurseries and the distribution of tree and plant hosts requires consolidation, 
quality-assurance, coordination and maintenance. There is also a need to determine gaps 
in data when these relate to identified threats.  
 
38 www.nbn.org.uk/ 
39 Data will be adequate for most tree species, but an increased sampling intensity would be required to 
provide comparable data for less common species or attributes that would increase the costs of the scheme. 
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Understanding data requirements is crucial to ensuring development and maintenance of 
appropriate surveillance and reporting. A ‘catalogue’ of recommended data sources should 
be developed that could be called on rapidly (see also Recommendation 7). The catalogue 
would state which data sources could be used for different types of host (native, non-
native, street tree) and degrees of host rarity. Improvements in data should focus on the 
distribution of host species on non-public land, in the urban environment, and along 
motorways and trunk roads to bring it up to the same level as for public forests, woodlands 
and other open lands not in the built environment. Information about trade networks is 
important for identifying the potential likely occurrence of a problem, for efficient 
deployment of inspectors to detect and manage outbreaks, and for understanding 
vulnerability to inadvertent spread of introduced pests and pathogens. In addition to data 
for the pathogen, host and networks, it is essential to have ready availability and access to 
environmental data, including soil type, and meteorology. 
It was clear to the Taskforce that preparedness for emerging livestock disease was more 
developed than preparedness for emerging plant disease, not least to protect the food 
chain and public health. However, in the plant sector the larger number and diversity of 
pests and pathogens and pathways for their introduction, make for a different challenge 
than for animal disease. The procedures for animal disease outbreak control include clear 
protocols for engagement with stakeholders, the deployment of resources, command and 
control, access to models, sampling and reporting protocols, and communication with the 
media. 
 
 
RECOMMENDATION 3 
Develop and implement procedures for preparedness and contingency 
planning to predict, monitor and control the spread of pests and 
pathogens. 
 
The Taskforce recognised that although preparedness measures are in place, a different 
approach is required to provide assurance that there is the capacity to model the 
epidemics, infestations, and stakeholder behaviour, and to act on recommendations 
arising from such analyses. This would ensure policy makers receive high quality and 
timely information and advice. It is also important to have in place effective and reliable 
methods for detection and diagnosis and to understand any limitations, for example, to 
allow for false positives and false negatives. These capacities would enable an efficient 
response to both known threats on the Plant Health Risk Register as well as newly 
emerged pests and pathogens about which little is known and ultimately, to cope 
generically, with the many unknown pests and pathogens moved in international trade. In 
an effort to improve the efficiency of pest and pathogen management measures are 
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needed that promote the early detection of incursions, through the ability to obtain, 
mobilise and direct resources. Such measures should include: 
Detection and diagnosis40: 
• forward planning for the detection of pests and pathogens and diagnosis of 
diseases; strategies for known threats should be drawn up in advance and gaps in 
knowledge (e.g. taxonomy) and resources (e.g. rapid molecular diagnostic tests) 
should be identified and commissioning research to address them considered; and 
• generic plans should be prepared for novel threats, to include pests and pathogens 
with different models for spread, with allowance for threats in which the causal 
agent may initially be unknown. 
Statistical epidemiology: 
• assurance of statistical epidemiological41 capacity for different types of threat to 
enable cost-effective monitoring and surveillance of the spread of pests and 
pathogens; and 
• capacity to estimate directly or indirectly (for example using data from related 
species) key parameters for use in epidemiological models. 
Trade and human behaviour: 
• planning to incorporate human activity into a novel threat response, for example 
human-mediated spread of disease, and the response of different sectors (forestry 
industry, nursery trade, retailers, travellers, the public) to different types of 
interventions; and 
• protocols to trace forward and trace back the sequence of past or potential 
incursions through trade networks. 
Pest and pathogen modelling: 
• capacity to model the spread of different pests and pathogens to predict their rate of 
spread, the effectiveness of different control measures, and to identify key 
epidemiological parameters and hence prioritise research needs; 
 
40  These together confirm presence of an agent – diagnosis may not always be needed, for example for a 
clearly identifiable insect or may not be possible at early stages of an outbreak when the agent is unknown. 
41 The study of the patterns, causes and effects of health and disease on changes in the size and age 
composition of defined populations.  
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• models should be developed in advance for specific known threats while generic 
models should be available as the basis for studying novel threats; 
• models should be open to examination and testing by the research community and 
be as transparent as possible to all stakeholders;  
• models should be refined and updated based on field verification data obtained 
whilst dealing with new or established pests and pathogens; and 
• ecological and epidemiological models should be constructed so that, according to 
the problem, they can be easily linked to diverse models of economic and social 
drivers and responses. 
Contingency planning: 
• designed to anticipate incursions and define the roles of those organisations 
responsible for outbreak response, including communication with stakeholders; and 
• prepared and agreed with stakeholders including identification of responsibilities 
ahead of incursions and shared amongst other EU Member States. 
4. Governance 
The Taskforce does not consider that the current legislative and governance arrangements 
are satisfactory. 
Plant Health Act and current governance 
The Plant Health Act 196742 resulted in responsibilities being split between the Forestry 
Commission and Defra43. Responsibility for plant health in Scotland lies with the Scottish 
 
42 The Plant Health Act (1967) states: 
(1)This Act shall have effect for the control of pests and diseases injurious to agricultural or horticultural 
crops, or to trees or bushes, and in the following provisions of this Act —  
(a) references to pests are to be taken as references to insects, bacteria, fungi and other vegetable or 
animal organisms, viruses and all other agents causative of any transmissible disease of agricultural or 
horticultural crops or of trees or bushes, and also as including references to pests in any stage of 
existence;  
(b) references to a crop are to be taken as including references to trees and bushes.  
(2) The competent authorities for purposes of this Act shall be—  
(a) as regards the protection of forest trees and timber from attack by pests, the Forestry Commissioners 
(“timber” for this purpose including all forest products); and  
(b) otherwise, for England and Wales the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and for Scotland the 
Secretary of State. 
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Government and in Wales with the Welsh Government. Responsibility for the Forestry 
Commission’s powers in Wales under the Plant Health Act has recently been transferred 
to Welsh Ministers who will delegate delivery of these back to the Forestry Commission. 
Separate arrangements apply in Northern Ireland. There are good working relationships 
amongst the different organisations and governments concerned when responding to pest 
and pathogen incursions. The Taskforce was concerned, however, that this depended on 
the goodwill of the individuals concerned and senior level support and that the governance 
arrangements for a joint response to managing pest and pathogen incursions are unclear. 
In addition to timely production of risk assessments for individual pests and pathogens, 
there is a need for more coherent governance in order to enable overall prioritisation and 
responsiveness to risks. 
Based on recent experience with the management of tree disease, there are major 
challenges in integrating the management and control responses in the diverse 
components of tree populations. These components include trees in forests, amenity sites 
(e.g. parks and gardens), street trees, orchards, trees along motorway and rail lines and in 
trade networks, including nurseries. Surveillance responsibility for organisms harmful to 
trees in the wider environment is shared between the Forestry Commission (where there is 
a threat to forests or woodland), Defra, Fera, Local Authority tree officers, landowners and 
managers, and householders. Management of an invading pest or pathogen currently 
requires the collection and collation of information from across this range of bodies in order 
to formulate mitigation and control strategies. The task is confounded where the data are 
owned by or only accessible to different organisations. More effective governance is 
necessary to manage the spread of the pests or pathogens in future. 
The Taskforce also noted that current legal instruments treat forest trees separately from 
other plant species. Various organisations have responsibility across the spectrum of tree 
and plant health and biosecurity (with Defra itself having different teams responsible for 
different areas that include forestry, crops, agriculture, and plant health). The current 
arrangements can lead to lack of clarity in the delimitation of responsibilities.  
The Taskforce noted the establishment of the UK Plant Health Strategy Board, which has 
the benefit of representation from the Devolved Administrations and from statutory bodies, 
along with collaboration with key stakeholders. The Taskforce recognised the potential 
benefits of this Board, and the importance of the right level of membership to ensure that 
joined-up policy decisions are being taken across the UK on the basis of common 
evidence. While the Board is strong on representation, it was not clear to the Taskforce 
that the body is currently well suited for decision making in relation to prioritisation of risks 
and contingency planning. 
 
43 As a first step towards improving plant health governance, plant health policy has been brought closer to 
the heart of Government, by transferring the Plant Health Policy Team from Fera (which carries out much of 
the co-ordinating role) to Defra on 31 December 2012. 
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The Taskforce was clear on the need for consistent and coordinated strategies across the 
Devolved Administrations and effective and timely liaison with the Irish Government. Pests 
and pathogens transcend political or geographical boundaries so a UK-wide, and ideally a 
British Isles, approach in identifying and managing threats is as essential as an EU-wide 
strategy. 
 
Responsibility, cost-sharing and learning from other countries 
The Taskforce recognised that partnership approaches to identify and tackle threats will be 
essential. A key consideration is to ensure a fair balance of costs and responsibilities 
between Government and others with an interest in maintaining healthy tree populations.  
Protocols need to be set up with key stakeholders that establish a procedure for sharing 
responsibilities and costs in advance. The Taskforce acknowledged the advantage of 
learning from experience gained by other countries44. Protocols for allocation of 
responsibilities and cost sharing in Australia and New Zealand have been considered. 
Both countries consider the risks of entry of potentially damaging organisms along a 
continuum that begins at the point of origin of the pest/pathogen or the goods that may 
bring such pests/pathogens into the country. There are clearly defined responsibilities for 
Government and industry along the pathway from point of origin to final destination and 
this includes agreements defining who bears the costs, at what levels and how judgements 
will be made about when costs will be incurred. Both Australia and New Zealand are 
moving toward a model in which those who pose the highest risks to plant health have to 
bear most of the costs of prevention. In particular, the Taskforce noted the "Deed 
approach"45, which is the Australian system of cost-sharing in biosecurity policy. This is 
based on an assessment of the extent to which the impact of the pest or pathogen is 
private versus public - the more public the impact, the greater the share of taxpayer 
funding. A similar scheme could be considered for the UK. 
 
 
RECOMMENDATION 4 
Review, simplify and strengthen governance and legislation. 
                                            
44 Australia and New Zealand Biosecurity Review published at: 
http://www.fera.defra.gov.uk/plants/plantHealth/documents/australiaNewZealandBiosecurityReview.pdf. This 
Fera review explicitly addressed the relationship between the recommendations from the interim report and 
the Australian system, drawing out parallels and common lessons. The Taskforce took this analysis into 
consideration in refining the recommendations in this report. 
45 The Australian ‘Deed approach’ is based on Government-industry agreements prior to a biosecurity 
breach, which prioritise and predefine post border surveillance, responsibility for incursion responses and 
who bears the costs of disease incursions. 
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The Taskforce concluded that current governance of tree and plant pests and pathogens 
needs to be strengthened and proposes that: 
• the Plant Health Act 196746 should be reviewed and updated to include all plants, 
and rendered consistent with other plant/tree protection legislation; 
• responsibility for plant health should be reviewed within and amongst the statutory 
authorities to create a coherent strategy for identification and management of the 
key threats across the whole of the UK to reduce the risks to the UK and Europe as 
a whole;  
• a common understanding is developed of who is responsible for preparedness and 
who takes control in emergencies; and 
• organisational cultures that may act as barriers to developing a strategic approach 
to contingency planning should be challenged. 
Development of governance should also consider the role of partnerships between 
statutory authorities and stakeholders, including non-governmental organisations, industry 
and landowners (both public and private), in order to: 
• establish a clear understanding of the respective responsibilities to ensure effective 
management of pests and pathogens; 
• examine approaches to cost-sharing, for example the Australian Deeds approach 
described above; and 
• establish risk management systems that can deal with different levels of uncertainty 
(following the principles set out in Recommendation 1). 
 
46 The Act was designed to protect commercial plantings of all plants and all plantings of trees and bushes, 
but not non-commercial plantings of other plants or wild plants other than trees and bushes. 
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B. International context and border security 
The Taskforce focused its attention on two core components. The first addresses the 
extent to which it is possible to access and use data and information about the spread of 
pests and disease in the EU and other regions in order to inform the Plant Health Risk 
Register and to prepare contingency plans (see recommendations 1 and 3). This would 
enable the UK to be better informed about the spread of pests and pathogens across the 
EU before they arrive in the UK. It would also assist in assessing changing risks of 
importing pests and pathogens from countries outside the EU with which there are major 
trading and travel links. The second component addressed by the Taskforce relates to 
ways of improving national biosecurity. 
5. International Intelligence  
Informed decision making about how to manage the spread of newly-arrived pests and 
pathogens requires an understanding of the biology, epidemiology and taxonomy of the 
agent. This includes knowledge of the host range of the agent, how it infects or feeds and 
reproduces on a host, how it the spreads between hosts, and what distinguishing features 
of the agent could be used for detection. Some information may be available in the 
scientific literature and in pest risk assessments. The Taskforce noted, however, that while 
even for well-studied pests and pathogens there are likely to be gaps in crucial 
information, some of these gaps could be filled by improved interrogation and collation of 
data from other regions in which the pest or pathogen has spread or is spreading. 
Accessing this form of epidemiological intelligence is particularly appropriate amongst 
Member States in the EU and within the European and Mediterranean Plant Protection 
Organisation (EPPO47) where there are already agreements in place for exchange and 
communication of pest and disease information48. The Taskforce was not convinced, 
however, that these lines of communication were yet being optimally used, particularly in 
understanding the spread of disease.  
The potential value and previous under-use of international intelligence has been 
especially evident in assessing the information needed to devise management plans for 
                                            
47 EPPO is the European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organisation. www.eppo.int/  
48 Before the discovery of A. glabripennis outbreak in Kent in March 2012, Fera and FR had learnt about how 
to manage Anoplophora outbreaks from other EU member states at the EU standing committee and via 
collaborative research projects such as the EUPHRESCO funded project Anoplorisk. This included visits to 
outbreak sites in the USA and Italy and the knowledge gained from these visits was shared within the UK 
and more widely in Europe. Since the outbreak of A. glabripennis was discovered in Kent, Fera scientists 
sought and received advice on how to manage the outbreak from colleagues in countries with experience of 
running eradication campaigns against the pest. A workshop on Fera / FCs management of the Kent 
outbreak was held in Germany in December 2012. 
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the recent outbreak of Chalara ash dieback in the UK. Analysis of relatively coarse data for 
regional spread of the disease across the continent could have enabled assessment of the 
risk of aerial spread to the UK, showing when and where it was likely to occur by this 
means of dispersal49. Data for the continental spread could also have been used earlier to 
inform epidemiological models to predict the likely rate and extent of spread in the UK50. 
There would also be advantages in sharing better resolved maps of susceptible host 
species and trade data throughout EU and EPPO Member States in order to understand 
how the spatial distribution of hosts and trade movements affect pest and disease spread. 
Early and accurate information on the taxonomic status of the new pathogenic species for 
ash dieback51 would have enabled more timely risk assessments to be carried out at 
European and UK levels, thereby increasing the possibility of earlier action against the 
disease.  
The Taskforce would like to see post-outbreak analyses of management strategies being 
made more widely available to show not only what worked but what did not work. One way 
to enable this would be to develop a shared understanding across key organisations in 
Member States of how epidemiological models could be used to analyse information about 
disease spread and the effectiveness of control strategies (see Recommendation 6) and 
also to foster improved use of data-bases to organise and share information (see 
Recommendation 7).  
Data on the frequency of interceptions of alien pest and pathogens to EU Member States 
from outside the EU via trade and individual imports would also prove useful in highlighting 
major pathways of risk. The Taskforce noted that Australian authorities were increasingly 
using intelligence from trading members to assess risks52. In considering the effectiveness 
of controls to prevent entry, the Taskforce also noted that it is almost impossible to know 
the extent to which current controls have prevented introduction of new pests and 
pathogens since ordinarily only those that do get through are publicised. The Officials 
Advisory Group reported 1,400 interceptions per annum53 of pests and pathogens on 
consignments moving in trade, mostly imported from non-EU countries54. 
 
 
49www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/181840/pb13936-chalara-
management-plan-201303.pdf.pdf 
50www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/181840/pb13936-chalara- 
management-plan-201303.pdf.pdf 
51 www.fraxback.eu/index.php?view=category&catid=8&option=com_joomgallery&Itemid=465 
52 Fera Biosecurity Review: 
http://www.fera.defra.gov.uk/plants/plantHealth/documents/australiaNewZealandBiosecurityReview.pdf. 
53 The Taskforce recognised that many of these interceptions represent a relatively low risk to the UK, being 
findings of, for example, fruit flies on fruit from subtropical climates, or low levels of other insect pests on 
plant produce intended for immediate consumption. 
54 www.fera.defra.gov.uk/scienceResearch/science/pestDisease/ 
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RECOMMENDATION 5 
Improve the use of epidemiological intelligence from EU/other regions 
and work to improve the EU regulations concerned with tree health and 
plant biosecurity.
In the future, maximising the use of epidemiological intelligence to inform the risk of pest 
and pathogen incursion and spread would require a combined UK and broader EU 
response including: 
• better positioning of tree health and plant biosecurity within EU regulations to 
ensure that threats from pests and pathogens are formally recognised at early 
stages and are followed by appropriate responses55; 
• strong support for the proposed EU ‘reverse strategy’ of robustly assessing risk in 
advance of new trade links and explicitly permitting trades rather than explicitly 
regulating trades that have already proved problematic (see Annex H); 
• improved reporting of data on the spread of emerging pests and pathogens; 
• sharing of epidemiological models amongst EU and EPPO Member States for 
analysis of epidemiological spread and comparison of mitigation and control 
strategies;  
• improved sharing of post-outbreak experience amongst EU and EPPO Member 
States to identify successful approaches to mitigation and control; 
• improving the communication of information about the pattern and intensity of 
spread of introduced pests and pathogens into and within the EU; and 
• accessing better data about trade imports into the EU, intra-EU movements, and 
the provenance of imports and plant materials traded within the EU. 
 
6. National Biosecurity 
The Taskforce noted trends in trade and travel towards greater volume of movement of 
people and goods, greater distances and speed of movement56, and novel types of trade, 
 
                                            
55 See Annex H for discussion of border controls. 
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such as mature trees in soil. All these increase the risk of introduction of non-native pests 
and pathogens. 
The Taskforce reviewed the regulatory framework, natural geographical barriers, and the 
potential for management of introductions of pests and pathogens. The Taskforce saw this 
as an area for significant improvement because the Single European Market currently 
means that all pests and pathogens introduced to the EU are likely to be eventually 
experienced across the whole of Europe (subject to variations in environmental 
conditions). The UK’s biosecurity from non-European threats is therefore largely 
dependent on the level of biosecurity applied by other EU Member States and by the 
effectiveness (in meeting EU requirements) of non-EU countries exporting plants and plant 
products to the EU.  
In addition, the Taskforce felt that businesses that import, or cultivate imported trees and 
other plants, should take significantly more responsibility to strengthen biosecurity by, for 
example, assuring the provenance of their supplies including both the plants and any soil 
associated with those plants. The Taskforce emphasised the additional risks posed by 
importation of larger quantities of soil, for example with mature trees for instant 
landscaping, in which pests and pathogens might be inadvertently present.  
The Officials Advisory Group pointed out to the Taskforce that significant progress could 
be made in some areas of biosecurity without additional legislative changes across the 
EU. The Taskforce proposes that tighter controls should be achieved through more 
proactive use of existing mechanisms both by the UK and by other EU Member States, for 
example, by seeking protected zone status before rather than after a pest or pathogen 
arrives in the UK. The Taskforce noted that the upcoming review of the Plant Health 
Regime by the EU was timely and represented an opportunity to improve the current 
regime to support better tree and plant biosecurity (see Annex H). 
 
 
RECOMMENDATION 6 
Strengthen biosecurity to reduce risks at the border and within the UK. 
 
The interim report identified three areas for action: activity within the UK; intra-EU trade; 
and non-EU trade into the UK (and other EU Member States). In developing this 
recommendation, the Taskforce recognised the need to balance effective enforcement to 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
56 Rodrigue, J.P., Comtois, C. & Slack, B. (2013). The Geography of Transport Systems, Routledge, London, 
pp 408: http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415822541/. 
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improve biosecurity with the need to keep trade and travel moving both within and outside 
the EU; as well as the need for the UK itself to act as a responsible exporter. The 
Taskforce recognised that any actions should also apply to soil, wood-based packaging 
and other plant products, each of which can harbour pests and pathogens. Certain 
pathways can be identified where there is a high risk of pathogen introduction, for example 
unsterilised soil imported with rooted plants, and action at the European level is needed to 
reduce the threat. The Taskforce was also mindful that any recommendation should not 
require significant resources to enable implementation, and that it should be simple and 
straightforward to maximise the likelihood of compliance and complemented by a 
programme of information and communication to increase understanding of the problem.  
Import for personal use:   
The Taskforce proposes that no plant material57 for personal use be imported from outside 
the EU58. Under a complete ban on material from outside the EU, Border Force staff would 
not need to be trained in recognising different species, thereby simplifying customs 
enforcement. However, implementation would need to be supported by an effective 
education programme to ensure travellers are aware of the risks and understand the 
necessary control and rules59. Communications would also need to be reviewed regularly 
to ensure that they are used effectively to reflect latest risk control priorities and are 
effectively targeted at specific regions to address the greatest risks of non-compliance. 
Given the risks to the UK, the Taskforce would ideally like to have seen the ban extended 
to the import of plants within personal baggage from within the EU. The Taskforce 
accepted, however, that major difficulties would arise in seeking exemption from the free 
movement of goods within the Single Market and accordingly did not include this formally 
within the recommendation. 
Import for commercial use:  
The Taskforce proposed that the Plant Passport60 scheme be strengthened and also 
applied to seed as a means of ensuring greater traceability (showing all ports of call for the 
 
57 Plant material covers dead matter, cut flowers and propagated plants. 
58 Following detailed consultation with representatives of the Border Force, the Taskforce concluded that a 
complete ban was the only practicable solution to prevent introductions of pests and disease by personal 
import from outside the EU. A detailed risk-based ban would be prohibitively expensive to implement 
requiring detailed botanical knowledge for customs officials and the public. 
59 Existing information available to travellers can be found at: https://www.gov.uk/bringing-food-animals-
plants-into-uk/plants 
60 When the Single European Market was created in 1993, plant passports were introduced to replace 
phytosanitary certificates for trade between Member States, and provide additional security for movements 
of plants within Member States. They are currently only required for plants associated with specific plant 
health risks, though the draft revised EU rules would extend passports to all plants other than retail sales. In 
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consignment within the EU and last port before entry to the EU). The scheme would not 
directly provide a measure of good plant health status but could be used by Plant Health 
Inspectors to decide whether a consignment needs an additional, precautionary inspection 
by officials. Any inspections would not happen at the UK border, because this would be 
difficult to implement without impeding the flow of trade and would miss potential problems 
as a result of latent infections that are difficult to detect until symptoms develop. Plant 
Health Inspectors could, however, use the Plant Passports to decide, taking a risk-based 
approach, which commercial premises need inspecting. In the event of sporadic 
outbreaks, the passporting information would help trace the source area and prevent 
further imports from it. 
The Taskforce proposed that changes to EU legislation should be pursued to ensure the 
Plant Passport scheme is run in conjunction with an industry-led certification scheme so 
that the key stakeholders are part of the system that ensures good plant health status. 
Such a scheme could follow a similar design to voluntary forest product certification 
schemes such as the Forest Stewardship Council and the Programme for the 
Endorsement of Forest Certification. Certification would inform buyers that the plant 
product comes from a production chain that is designed to minimise plant health risk, and 
that the product itself is pest- and disease-free. Certification could lead to a price premium, 
and thus an incentive for producers and retailers to improve their plant health practices 
throughout the supply chain. However, the Taskforce noted that any significant sales 
volume of non-certified products would pose risks of pest and pathogen spread throughout 
the system; thus a certification scheme would only be effective if it achieved high levels of 
adoption from producers, wholesalers and retailers. Government would have an important 
role in facilitating the creation of such a scheme. 
Risks from wood-based packaging, biomass products and soil:   
The Taskforce recognised that wood-based packaging can be a significant source of 
infection as demonstrated in 2012 by 228 findings of pests during import inspections of 
such material from non European countries. This included 67 critical findings of pests like 
Anoplophora glabripennis and other longhorn beetles. Such packaging can be a significant 
pathway for movement of pests and pathogens and the Taskforce was concerned that the 
current rules (whereby packaging wood and pallets are covered by International 
Phytosanitary Measure ISPM1561 that requires treatment of the wood used) are not 
implemented with sufficient rigour, or that the mark of compliance may be used 
 
the UK, plant passports are issued by authorised nurseries under official supervision from the plant health 
service. 
61 ISPM 15 is an International Phytosanitary Measure that sets out the need to treat wood materials of a 
thickness greater than 6mm that is used to ship products between countries. It affects all wood packaging 
material, requiring that it be treated with heat or fumigated and marked with a seal of compliance. Products 
exempt from the ISPM 15 are made from alternative material, like paper, plastic or wood panel products (i.e. 
hardboard, plywood and oriented strand board).  
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inappropriately. Additional work needs to be done to improve compliance. The Taskforce 
also noted the risk of introducing pests and pathogens in soil with imported plants and the 
need to include the soil-pathway in managing risks. Of particular concern was the growing 
volume of soil imported into the EU in this way, with the associated increase in the risk of 
pests and pathogens being introduced into Europe62. 
Trade in biomass for energy production or as a raw material is likely to increase and a 
workable but inclusive framework for risk assessment and regulation is needed. The large 
UK biomass power generators anticipate a significant increase in the level of imports of 
woodfuel products. Almost all the large users are planning to import wood pellets, which 
are not currently a controlled commodity because the heat and pressure involved in 
manufacture acts as a phytosanitary treatment. The risks associated with a switch to 
importing wood chips needs to be monitored. 
A risk-based approach: 
The Taskforce proposes that a risk-based approach should be taken to dealing with 
commercial plant health issues, both at UK borders and on commercial premises. Efforts 
can then be focused on high-risk pathways, hosts, and pests or pathogens and those from 
countries where organisms when transported to the UK have been shown to present a 
risk. Border Force receives monthly updates from Defra on the status of animal health 
issues in other countries, and this approach could be extended to plant health. 
The Taskforce identified three areas in which progress could be made to strengthen 
national biosecurity to control and prevent the introduction of new pests and pathogens. 
These should be balanced against the benefits of pest and pathogen control and 
consideration of any unintended consequences. 
• Activity in the UK should include: 
 promotion to the public of the risks posed by plant pests and pathogens, and the 
importance of tree health and plant biosecurity; 
 promotion of, and responsibility for, biosecurity in the commercial movement and 
importation of plants, seeds, plant products and soil amongst key stakeholders. 
These particularly include forestry, arboriculture, tree horticultural nursery trade 
businesses; but private imports by the public, e.g. via tourism, mail order, and 
through internet purchases are also important; 
 
62 The Taskforce welcomed the fact that new EU legislation is now in force setting specific and harmonised 
standards for inspecting Chinese wood packaging, which represents a significant threat. 
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 systems of industry-led certification, including original provenance, plant 
transport trail/chain of custody, monitoring, assurance of trade partners’ sources, 
linked to the regulatory inspection regime; 
 provision and use of rapid diagnostic tests by industry to identify and remove 
pests and pathogens at the point of entry or within current stock; 
 promotion of the value and use of certified and audited provenance (and other 
potential product labelling) for pest- and pathogen-free plants to encourage a 
culture of biosecurity; and 
 encouragement of the local production of trees for woodland and amenity 
planting and the use of natural regeneration, where site conditions allow, and it 
is consistent with woodland objectives. 
• Action on intra-EU trade could include: 
 timely notification by all EU Member States to other Member States of 
occurrences of new pest and pathogen hazards; 
 reviewing, extending and strengthening the use and effectiveness of plant 
passports for controlling pest and pathogen spread, including full chain of 
custody information (i.e. place(s) of production and origin of seed to ensure 
traceability back through the supply chain) and this information reaching the end 
customers; 
 pest risk analysis and commodity risk analysis at a larger scale (i.e. across the 
EU) to match the scale of the entry pathway of pests; 
 timely establishment of protected zones, in the light of epidemiological 
intelligence, and strengthening the use of protected zone status by shifting the 
emphasis towards precaution; 
 supporting a proposal in the review of the EU plant health regime to extend the 
internal movement controls to all plants for planting, subject to the outcome of 
the review of the effectiveness of such a regime (see above); 
 notification across all EU Member States of the import within any individual EU 
Member State of plants of high-risk  as defined by the UK Risk Register; 
 monitoring of threats including pathways into the UK in order to take rapid 
protective action if necessary; and 
 a more robust approach by the EU to imposing sanctions on those who break 
the rules - e.g. by masking infection through the use of fungicides, or exporting 
 35 | Tree Health and Plant Biosecurity Expert Taskforce 
 
                                           
plants from areas known to have pests or pathogens present - and on member 
states who fail to report in a timely manner. 
• Non-EU trade into the UK (and other EU Member States) could include: 
 new trade, involving new products or a new country of origin, should not be 
carried out without strict risk management measures until an appropriate UK risk 
assessment has been conducted by the industry/importer (see Annex I); 
 a risk-based approach where inspectors target highest risk source countries 63; 
 consideration of the role and practicability of import levies or damage liability 
bonds across a range of plants and wood material to reflect expected damage 
costs, and to allow cost recovery for mitigation and adaptation strategies; 
 introduction of a quarantine mechanism for imports of plants and wood material, 
where there is a high risk of pest or pathogen presence because of the nature of 
the import or the source area; 
 introduction of mechanisms to reduce the likelihood of people coming into the 
UK carrying diseased or pest-infested plant material; 
 review of the potential for treatment to kill pests and pathogens on imported 
wood products and live plant material; and 
 review of the risks posed by imports of soil, either on its own or associated with 
plants. 
The Taskforce noted that implementation of some of these proposals involves 
strengthening compliance with existing legislative requirements but others would be likely 
to involve the introduction of new legislation and a change in EU legislation. They also 
noted that original research will be needed to design methods for treating live plant imports 
when they represent a high risk. 
 
63 The Taskforce noted that Australia has increasingly switched its security from the borders to consider a 
risk based approach to identify heightened threats from those countries that are likely to be sources of 
important pests and pathogens. 
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C. Capabilities and Communication 
Implementation of the recommendations set out in this report depends on accurate data 
and evidence to inform risk-based approaches and to implement control measures. The 
recommendations also depend upon having the right skills to deal with tree and other plant 
pests and diseases at different scales, as well as underpinning natural and social science 
essential to inform and implement policy decisions. In this section, the Taskforce 
considered the need for efficient web-based interactive tools to facilitate access to 
information to enable effective risk-based decisions to be made, and to ensure that all 
stakeholders are informed and up-to-date. The Taskforce also considered the key skills 
gaps that might hinder implementation of suitable plant biosecurity measures. 
Tree health and plant biosecurity is a complex issue, and while new research funding and 
capacity can always be employed to good effect, it is clear that it will be increasingly 
important to engage wider society in supporting efforts to improve the UK’s biosecurity. 
Such initiatives would clearly help create a wide network of individuals able to identify plant 
pests and pathogens. Alongside that, it is important that better links are made between the 
statutory bodies, non-governmental organisations, research institutes and universities – 
perhaps through (although not limited to) co-financing, co-supervising or hosting PhD 
studentships or secondments and advanced courses of appropriate types. 
7. Co-ordination of information and communication 
While there are multiple sources of information about pests and pathogens (e.g. the 
illustrative list at Annex G), including risks and methods of control and management, the 
Taskforce identified a need to introduce new methods for the collation of information. 
Currently, much of the information base consists of accumulated reports and stand-alone 
databases, for example, the European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organisation’s 
database64. Using modern information technology and the science of informatics there is 
an opportunity to develop a structured approach to the knowledge base that will allow the 
efficient interrogation of databases, using the “semantic web” and related tools. Such a 
resource would make information readily available and enable it to be accessed, 
summarised and updated more efficiently, whether it is required for high-level policy or for 
detailed studies of particular threats. Implementation of an information system would be 
linked to the implementation of the Plant Health Risk Register outlined in Recommendation 
1. The Taskforce acknowledged that some of this can be achieved using internet search 
engines, but is recommending a more sophisticated approach that will utilise current rapid 
advances in information science. The aim is to ensure the provision of efficient and reliable 
                                            
64 http://www.eppo.int/DATABASES/databases.htm 
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access to the data and information that have been collected for the purposes of improving 
tree health and plant biosecurity. This resource would include the Plant Health Risk 
Register, and enable epidemiological preparedness and intelligence about the spread of 
pests and pathogens including threats to the UK. Effective categorisation of the 
information should also enable easy access through search engines.  
The Taskforce noted the promise and relevance of collaboration between scientists and 
members of the public to record and analyse observations and measurements65 
concerning tree health and plant biosecurity. Improved methods for collecting and 
retrieving data therefore need to be designed with public accessibility or involvement in 
mind; drawing on the UK Environmental Observation Framework’s good practice guide66. 
 
 
RECOMMENDATION 7 
Develop a modern, user-friendly, system to provide quick and intelligent 
access to information about tree health and plant biosecurity. 
 
Robust approaches to biosecurity increasingly rely upon genomic, taxonomic, ecological, 
epidemiological, social and economic analyses as well as the integration of information 
from disparate sources. Tools for interrogation and analysis of the information and data 
need to be intelligent and based on user-focused design. In particular, there is a need to 
consider: 
• learning from elsewhere (e.g. animal health tools and international practice) to 
develop expert systems for rapid and efficient interrogation of information related to 
risk registers, epidemiological preparedness and contingency plans for pest and 
pathogen threats, including changes in strain prevalence within species; 
• updating of information about factors affecting spread, impact and the effectiveness 
of interception, mitigation and adaptation strategies for different classes of pest and 
pathogen as a basis to inform reactions to new threats;  
• provision and linkage of host data and other relevant data such as meteorological 
data; 
 
                                            
65 An early Defra-funded study examined the role of the public in collecting data about the leaf-mining moth 
Phyllonorycter leucographella: Agassiz, D. J. L., Nash, D. R., Godfray, H.C. J. and Lawton, J.H. (1994). 
Estimating the spread of small invading organisms using information from the public. Global Ecology and 
Biogeography Letters. 4:1-8. 
66 www.ukeof.org.uk/co_citizen.aspx?cookieConsent=A 
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• developing cost-effective surveillance and response strategies; 
• helping members of the public to contribute to surveillance efforts, taking account of 
the strengths (e.g. in sampling many more sites) and weaknesses (e.g. uncertainty 
in reporting accuracy of this approach). Such assistance from the public may come 
through provision of the necessary knowledge or skill via the internet; or from 
specialised groups, such as societies devoted to the study of particular taxonomic 
groups67; 
• development of a user-friendly portal that goes beyond core plant health issues but 
which can, for instance, direct importers to information on import regulations; and 
• promoting effective awareness raising and general communication about tree and 
other plant pests and pathogens. 
8. Maintaining and Building Capability 
The Taskforce noted with concern that there has been an erosion of capability, in the UK 
and internationally68, to deal with some aspects of tree and other plant pests and disease. 
In addition, there has been a decline in some of the underpinning natural and social 
science expertise essential to inform and implement policy. Some issues can be 
addressed with the existing skills base but others require a longer-term strategic review 
involving the Research Councils, Higher and Further Education Institutions, and 
Government. 
 
 
RECOMMENDATION 8 
Address key skills shortages. 
The skills needed to perform key tasks lie in a range of disciplines. An indicative list of 
areas in which there is a threat of loss of capability includes: 
• understanding of the taxonomy and whole-organism biology of organisms considered 
to present a high risk to plant health, and their hosts; 
 
                                            
67 Examples of such successes include public recognition and reporting of the Colorado beetle helping to 
keep it from establishing in the UK despite being present in France for 100 years. Also, if the Asian longhorn 
beetle is successfully eradicated from Kent, it will only be because someone saw the beetle in 2009 and 
raised the alarm thus leading to continued surveys in the area that eventually picked up the outbreak. 
68 European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organisation (EPPO) Madeira Declaration (2003): Plant 
Health Endangered. http://gd3.eppo.int/reporting.php/article1664  
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• development of new detection and management methods and approaches;  
• analysis of environmental, social and economic aspects of pest and disease risk at the 
regional and landscape scales; 
• integration of socio-economic and environmental considerations into analysis of 
disease impacts and response strategies; 
• the ability of the plant health inspectorate to identify and mitigate plant health risks; 
• advice to industry on how to plant resilient forests and the research base required to 
design them; 
• capture and use of specialist biological data and knowledge; 
• epidemiological analysis to assess risks with integrated socio-economic analyses of 
pest and disease impacts; and 
• training and leadership in knowledge and understanding of pests and pathogens within 
the wider stakeholder community. 
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V. Knowledge Gaps 
Knowledge gaps are likely to make it difficult to implement effective policy in the short and 
long term. Some of these gaps have emerged in the discussion of the preceding 
recommendations. The Taskforce, with input from the Officials Advisory Group, explored 
knowledge gaps against a set of evidence categories in the table below. Attention was 
also given to scientific, technological, logistical, social and political barriers that might 
affect implementation of policy but which might be overcome by research. 
The principal knowledge gaps and potential areas for improvements, along with short 
explanations, are summarised in the table below. Some of these knowledge gaps are 
reflected in the Defra Tree Health and Plant Biosecurity Evidence Plan69. They have 
already fed into the current call for the cross-departmental research initiative on Tree 
Health and Plant Biosecurity. The latter is jointly funded by Defra, Devolved 
administrations, the Forestry Commission and several Research Councils (BBSRC, 
NERC, ESRC)70, and is supported by the Living with Environmental Change (LWEC) 
partnership. This joint strategic research initiative brings together, and helps develop, a 
wide research capacity and capability in the UK. The initiative seeks to address the urgent 
need for innovative and cutting-edge interdisciplinary research to help ensure the future 
health and resilience of trees, woodlands and their associated ecosystems, including 
appreciation of their significance as a landscape, and cultural and social value. The 
Taskforce welcomed the initiative, noting that longer-term support of the research base 
would be essential to build on this initiative in order to respond effectively to continuing 
pest and disease threats. 
                                            
69 http://www.defra.gov.uk/publications/files/pb13929-evidenceplan-tree-health-plant-biosecurity.pdf  
70 www.bbsrc.ac.uk/funding/opportunities/2012/tree-health-and-plant-biosecurity.aspx  
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Category Examples of knowledge gaps 
Epidemiology71  • Shortage of data on host distributions: essential to collate and 
make data available. 
• Generic modelling and parameter estimation frameworks: 
promoting transparency in model assumptions and flexibility in 
adapting for new pests and pathogens including ‘unknown’ but 
related genera and species. 
• Knowledge of transmission and dispersion patterns to inform 
estimates of spread and effectiveness of landscape-scale control 
strategies. 
• Interactions between different pests and pathogens and their 
simultaneous combined impacts. 
• Economic and social costs of disease including factors leading to 
changes in virulence or hosts attacked; and the behaviour of 
relevant people and organisations. 
Surveying and 
Surveillance 
 
• Methods for sensitive and rapid detection at ports of entry. 
• Improvement of the resolution and effectiveness of remote 
sensing. 
• Intelligent surveying informed by modelling, including risk-based 
sampling. 
• Sensible sampling: reporting of negative results; taking account 
of temporal and spatial nature of pest and pathogen spread for 
optimal sampling. 
• Behaviours and compliance of stakeholders in relation to 
controls. 
• Quality assurance / development of systems to handle large 
volumes of data of variable quality collected by non-experts in 
different locations. 
Detection 
 
• Diagnostic tools, genomics; portable equipment for improved 
detection. 
• Improved taxonomy including within-species variation. 
• Sentinel plants (both in the UK and abroad) to identify unknown 
risks. 
• Understanding the costs versus benefits of detection in the 
context of significant uncertainty. 
                                            
71 Epidemiology is taken here to include the introduction, establishment, spread, and control of pathogens 
and the impacts of disease. 
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Category Examples of knowledge gaps 
Mitigation and adaptation 
strategies 
 
• Role of chemical control in managing pest and pathogen 
incursions. 
• Breeding methods (including developing host cultivars with 
durable pest and disease resistance): understanding of native 
and non-native trees in ecosystem services and the role of forest 
diversification (including genetic diversification). 
• Control by alterations in forest management: matching the scale 
of control with the inherent temporal and spatial scales of an 
epidemic. 
• Biological control (has proved effective in controlling selected 
tree pests and pathogens), but requires reappraisal of likely 
effectiveness for new threats. 
• Impact of policy measures on disease spread (linked to 
epidemiology) and related benefits and costs of mitigation and 
adaptation. 
• An understanding of resilience at the tree, stand and landscape 
scales and of the influence of silvicultural systems on 
epidemiology and pest dynamics. 
• Assessment of capacity of mitigation procedures to remove 
multiple pests and pathogens in a ‘manage once, remove many’ 
process. 
Social science • Lessons for governance, management and stakeholder 
engagement from critical reconstructions of past outbreaks 
(including study of the risk perceptions of key stakeholders and 
the identification of ‘risk amplification’ indicators). 
• Better understanding of the identity, behaviour, interests and 
influence of key actors and stakeholder groupings involved in 
ensuring tree health and health of other plants. 
• Critical assessments of the potential contribution and limitations 
of citizen science in relation to surveillance and disease control. 
• Analyses of the cultural values attached to trees and woodland 
and the use of both economic and deliberative methods to test 
and refine the public interest case for government intervention to 
protect tree health. 
• Evaluation of the impacts and outcomes of policy interventions. 
Trade patterns 
 
• Effects of changing patterns of trade and travel on risk of pest 
and pathogen introductions. 
• Trade patterns (volume and pattern) including traceability and 
private importers. 
• Industry imports and costs of import controls to different 
stakeholders (e.g. to forestry sector, to households). 
 43 | Tree Health and Plant Biosecurity Expert Taskforce 
 
Category Examples of knowledge gaps 
Environmental change 
 
• Predicting effects of environment change on susceptibility of 
trees and risks of known pest and pathogen threats. 
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VI. Concluding remarks 
• The recommendations in this report map out a new approach to protecting tree health 
and improving plant biosecurity in the UK.  
• The eight recommendations are inter-related. Collectively, they comprise a coherent 
programme to improve tree health and plant biosecurity that encompasses: 
o a risk-based approach for prioritisation and preparation for pest and disease 
threats to the UK; 
o improved governance to enable greater co-ordination and acknowledgement of 
shared responsibilities amongst key stakeholders in managing pest and disease; 
o improved use of recent scientific developments for detection and diagnosis, for 
predictive epidemiological modelling, and for rapid information exchange 
amongst key stakeholders; and 
o enhanced control of pest and disease at the borders through greater use of 
current EU legislation and effecting timely influence of EU legislation currently 
under review. 
• The remit for the Taskforce required a focus on tree health. Many of the 
recommendations also apply to improving biosecurity of agricultural and horticultural 
crops and of plants in urban and wider environments.  
• Knowing how, when and where to manage pest and disease effectively requires: an 
understanding of how to prevent entry, how to improve interception and how to effect 
eradication quickly following early detection. It is also important to improve 
understanding of mitigation and adaptation to deal with endemic and newly-established 
pests and pathogens. Effective control requires an understanding of likely risks 
including environmental, social and economic impacts. It also requires detailed 
knowledge of where the susceptible hosts are, the nature of trade links to enable 
forward and backward tracing of incursions, and an understanding of social and 
behavioural responses to pest disease threats and to demands for control.  
• Partnership between Government, statutory authorities and stakeholders, including 
non-governmental organisations, industry and landowners, and the public is important 
for effective biosecurity. The recommendations present an opportunity to ensure that 
the roles and responsibilities of all participants are clearly defined and collectively 
understood. 
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• Turning such a strategic system for managing pests and disease into an operational 
system to improve biosecurity within trading networks will require the costs to be 
distributed between those carrying responsibility at each step in the supply chain. 
Clearly, benefits are likely to be maximised across the whole trading system by 
ensuring those who supply plants or plant products are aware of their responsibilities to 
prevent incursion, and that they bear the costs associated with both implementation of 
effective prevention and with infraction if that occurs. Much of this can be implemented 
at the point of origin of the plant or plant product. 
• Some investment will be necessary but the recommendations are also designed to 
improve the effectiveness of the deployment of current resources by raising 
awareness, by focusing efforts using risk-based assessment, by making greater use of 
modern technology and better use of current legislation. 
• Finally, the recommendations are designed to protect plant health and tree health 
especially in the UK. This also provides an opportunity for the UK and other partners 
for growth in trade of healthy plant material and plant products. 
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Annex A – UK major plant and tree 
pest/pathogen introductions 1900-2010 
 
The following table draws on data from the Forestry Commission and Fera and shows UK 
major tree and other pest / pathogen introductions over the period 1900-2010 (cumulative). 
 
 
 47 | Tree Health and Plant Biosecurity Expert Taskforce 
 
Annex B – Taskforce Terms of Reference, 
membership, and Register of Interests 
TREE HEALTH AND PLANT BIOSECURITY EXPERT 
TASKFORCE 
Terms of Reference 
Summary 
Professor Ian Boyd, Defra’s Chief Scientific Adviser (CSA), has convened a Tree Health 
and Plant Biosecurity72 Expert Taskforce to support Defra’s response to tree and plant 
disease outbreaks. The Taskforce will draw on and review evidence to provide 
recommendations to identify risks to the UK from tree pests and pathogens and on the 
steps necessary to prepare for and deal with outbreaks. 
The Taskforce will provide independent expertise on tree and plant health and will support 
Defra’s CSA in ensuring the Secretary of State for Defra has access to the most up-to-date 
and robust evidence to inform decisions on dealing with tree and plant disease outbreaks. 
The Taskforce will work towards a new UK Tree and Plant Health Strategy and will be 
giving focus and drive to work already underway as part of the Tree Health and Plant 
Biosecurity Action Plan. 
Aims of the Taskforce: 
• To review domestic and international risks presented from new and emerging tree and 
related plant pests and pathogens, including using best available evidence, 
assessment of risk status, and appropriate risk assessment tools. 
• To provide an independent perspective on costs and benefits to inform priority setting 
and resource allocation. 
• To identify potential obstacles to removing barriers to improve tree health and plant 
biosecurity, and suggest ways of resolving them. 
                                            
72The Taskforce will focus on tree health and related Biosecurity in Great Britain. This includes trees in 
woodlands, forests and in the wider environment, including amenity, fruit, and urban trees. Woody shrubs 
associated with trees and green spaces, are relevant as either a pathway of introduction/ spread of serious 
pest and pathogen threats, or where they act as sources of infection or infestation of trees (LWEC, 2011). 
Available at Securing Tree Health in a Changing Environment). 
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• To make use of international best practice in tree health and plant biosecurity 
management. 
• To produce a rapid evidence assessment and make recommendations for next steps 
including identifying crucial knowledge gaps. 
• To consider whether the current plant health policy and delivery infrastructure and risk 
mitigation framework needs to be overhauled and make recommendations for change, 
if required. 
• To review the current contingency planning and emergency response arrangements 
and recommend changes, if required. 
Governance: 
The Taskforce is chaired by Professor Chris Gilligan and will report to Professor Ian Boyd, 
Defra’s Chief Scientific Adviser who will in turn make recommendations to Defra’s 
Secretary of State. It is acknowledged that Taskforce members may have links to other 
groups working on behalf of Defra or may be in receipt of Defra funding. Any potential 
conflicts of interest will be recorded. The Taskforce will be supported by a public sector 
Officials Advisory Group, and external peer reviewers. 
The outputs of the Taskforce are expected to be: 
(i) an interim report including evidence-based recommendations (by end Nov 2012); 
(ii) a final report on the Taskforce’s strategic view of the evidence (Spring 2013). 
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Taskforce Members 
 
Professor Christopher Gilligan (Chair): 
Professor of Mathematical Biology, University of Cambridge. 
 
Professor Robert Fraser: 
Professor of Agricultural Economics, University of Kent. 
 
Professor Charles Godfray: 
Hope Professor of Zoology (Entomology), University of Oxford. 
 
Professor Nicholas Hanley: 
Professor of Environmental Economics, University of Stirling. 
 
Professor Simon Leather: 
Professor of Entomology, Harper Adams University. 
 
Professor Thomas Meagher: 
Professor of Plant Biology, University of St Andrews. 
 
Professor John Mumford: (from January 2013) 
Professor of Natural Resource Management, Imperial College London. 
 
Professor Judith Petts CBE: 
Professor of Environmental Risk Management, University of Southampton. 
 
Professor Nicholas Pidgeon: 
Professor of Environmental Psychology, Cardiff University. 
 
Dr Clive Potter: (from January 2013) 
Reader in Environmental Policy, Imperial College London.  
 
Professor Michael Shaw: (from January 2013) 
Professor of Plant Disease Ecology, University of Reading.  
 
Dr Jens-Georg Unger: 
Head of the Institute for National and International Plant Health in Germany. 
 
Dr Stephen Woodward: 
Reader at the School of Biological Sciences, University of Aberdeen. 
 
Professor Michael Jeger, Observer (November meeting): 
Imperial College London 
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Register of Interests 
The register records declarations made by members in respect of interests they have that 
are relevant to the remit of the Tree Health and Plant Biosecurity Expert Taskforce. 
Members agreed to withdraw from discussion of matters in which they felt that they could 
not act impartially. 
 
Taskforce Member Declared Interest 
Professor Chris Gilligan 
(Chair) 
Head of School of Biological Sciences, and member of senior 
management committees at University of Cambridge concerned 
with research, including the General Board, Research Policy 
Committee. Staff in the School of Biological Sciences for whom I 
am responsible receive funding from Defra. 
Head of Epidemiology and Modelling Group at University of 
Cambridge that is funded to provide advice on emerging plant 
pathogens used by Defra (including Chalara fraxinea, 
Phytophthora ramorum, acute oak decline), USDA and other 
international organisations. 
Current and recent research grant funding in epidemiology and 
mathematical biology from Biotechnology and Biological 
Sciences Research Council (BBSRC), Gates Foundation, Defra, 
DfID, United States. Department of Agriculture (USDA), BP.  
Chair Management Board Cambridge Programme for 
Sustainability Leadership. 
Chair of Defra’s Science Advisory Council. 
Trustee Natural History Museum. 
Honorary Research Fellow, Rothamsted Research. 
Professor Thomas 
Meagher Member, NERC Council. 
Co-Chair, LWEC DEFRA/BBSRC Tree Health and Plant 
Biosecurity Phase 1 funding panel. 
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Taskforce Member Declared Interest 
Professor Nick Pidgeon 
Member DEFRA/DECC Social Sciences Advisory Panel. 
Member DECC Science Advisory Group. 
Director of Understanding Risk Research Group at Cardiff 
University, and principal investigator on research grants looking 
at risk, new technology and the environment from NERC, ESRC, 
EPSRC, and USNSF. None currently concerned with tree health 
or biosecurity. 
Co-investigator Cardiff University Institute for Sustainable 
Places.  
Co-investigator Climate Change Consortium for Wales (C3W), 
and member of Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research. 
Advice to Government Office of Science via recent Foresight 
programmes, and Review of DECC science. 
Member of the external Academic Advisory Panel to the ESRC 
Genomics Research and Policy Forum. 
Dr Clive Potter 
Leading two Defra funded research projects on  stakeholder 
engagement in, and public awareness of, tree health issues. 
Professor Nick Hanley 
Member of Defra’s Economic Advisory Panel. 
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Taskforce Member Declared Interest 
Professor John Mumford 
Chair of the Great Britain Non-native Species Risk Analysis 
Panel (Defra, Welsh Assembly and Scottish Government). 
Contract with EFSA to develop a quantitative pathway analysis 
for pest pathways related to various edible commodities. 
Investigator in an EC FP7 Security Theme project 
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related to plant and food security. 
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STDF and AusAID on export quality horticultural biosecurity in 
SE Asia. 
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horticultural research. 
Director of Agra-CEAS Consulting Ltd, a consulting company 
partly owned by Imperial College London, which on occasion 
provides consulting services to Defra. 
Academic employed by Imperial College London; the range of 
duties and research sponsors is available at 
www.imperial.ac.uk/people/j.mumford. 
Dr Steve Woodward 
Lead on one of the LWEC Tree health and Plant biosecurity 
Phase I projects; and an evaluator for LWEC Phase 1 bids. 
Co-ordinator for an EU-funded RTC project that deals with alien 
invasive pests and pathogens of trees (ISEFOR). 
Management Committee Member for FP1002 PERMIT (Pathway 
Evaluation and Pest Risk Management in Transport) and 1102 
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Annex C – Officials Advisory Group Terms of 
Reference 
TREE HEALTH AND PLANT BIOSECURITY OFFICIALS 
ADVISORY GROUP (OAG):  Terms of Reference 
Summary 
Professor Ian Boyd, Defra’s Chief Scientific Adviser (CSA), has convened a Tree Health 
and Plant Biosecurity73 Expert Taskforce to support Defra’s response to tree and plant 
disease outbreaks. The Taskforce will draw on and review evidence to provide 
recommendations to identify risks to the UK from tree pests and pathogens and on the 
steps necessary to prepare for and deal with outbreaks. 
An Officials Advisory Group (OAG) comprising experts from Defra and the Defra Network 
will support the Taskforce. The OAG will help to ensure complementary actions to work 
already underway for the Tree Health and Plant Biosecurity Action Plan. 
Aims of the OAG: 
• To raise awareness of the Taskforce of planned and current activities on the ground. 
• To provide expert advice to the Taskforce where required. 
• To review recommendations from the Taskforce to consider their feasibility and how 
they complement existing activities. 
• To develop operational plans to support policy implementation of the Secretary of 
State’s response to the Taskforce recommendations. 
Governance: 
The OAG provides an advisory role to the expert Taskforce and as such will not make an 
independent report or meet separately. The Taskforce will draw on the OAG advice to 
revise recommendations and in their work towards a new Tree and Plant Health Strategy. 
                                            
73The Taskforce will focus on tree health and related Biosecurity in Great Britain. This includes trees in 
woodlands, forests and in the wider environment, including amenity, fruit, and urban trees. Woody shrubs 
associated with trees and green spaces, are relevant as either a pathway of introduction/ spread of serious 
pest and pathogen threats, or where they act as sources of infection or infestation of trees (LWEC, 2011). 
Available at Securing Tree Health in a Changing Environment. 
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Officials Advisory Group members 
Dr Chris Cheffings Joint Nature Conservation Committee 
Dr Joan Webber Forest Research  
Tony Kirkham Royal Botanical Gardens, Kew 
Nigel Gibbens Defra 
Wilma Harper Forestry Commission 
Martin Ward Food and Environment Research Agency  
Roger Coppock  Forestry Commission 
Dr John Morgan Forestry Commission 
Julie Hitchcock  Defra 
Ian Mitchell Defra 
Prof. Peter Freer-
Smith 
Forest Research  
Hugh Clayden  Forestry Commission Scotland 
Prof. Hugh Evans Forestry Research in Wales 
Dr David Slawson  Food and Environment Research Agency 
NOTE – Invaluable advice was also provided towards the end of the Taskforce’s 
deliberations by Sharon Mole – Interim Deputy Director, National Customs Operations, 
Border Force. 
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Annex D – Peer Reviewers 
We gratefully acknowledge the contributions of peer reviewers who undertook to provide 
their quality assurance and thoughtful comments:   
 
Professor Ian Bateman 
University of East Anglia 
 
Dr Keith Kirby 
University of Oxford 
 
Professor John Lucas 
Rothamsted Research 
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Annex E – Governance arrangements for UK 
tree and plant health issues 
The responsibilities of public agencies for plant health are set out in the Plant Health Act 
1967 [1], which splits responsibility in England between the Forestry Commission and 
Defra (who in 2009 delegated responsibility for plant health to the Food and Environment 
Research Agency (Fera)). The Plant Health Act 1967 prescribes the Forestry 
Commissioners as the competent authority in Great Britain for the protection of forest trees 
and timber, although the Act does not define "forest trees".  
The Forestry Commission monitors forest tree health, at a national level, for quarantine 
pests, in accordance with EC Directive 92/70/EEC. More generally it monitors the 
condition of woodland trees as part of the National Forest Inventory and through reports to 
the Tree Health Diagnostic and Advisory Service. Whilst there is no legal definition of 
"forest trees" the Forestry Commission’s remit, has through custom and practice, been 
interpreted as including at least those tree and shrub species for which the Forestry 
Commission would pay grant aid [2] for woodland creation and regeneration.  
Forestry is a devolved matter. The Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs has responsibility for forestry in England as well as certain activities such as 
international affairs, which are reserved. Responsibility for forestry in Scotland lies with the 
Scottish Government and in Wales with Welsh Ministers. Separate arrangements apply in 
Northern Ireland covered by the Plant Health Act (Northern Ireland) 1967.  
The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) co-ordinates plant health 
policy across the UK and Crown Dependencies and represents the UK as the "Single 
Central Authority" under the EU Plant Health Directive. Defra is also the contact point for 
the UK "National Plant Protection Organization" under the International Plant Protection 
Convention. These responsibilities were delegated to Fera, but, as a first step towards 
improving plant health governance, Defra decided to bring plant health policy closer to the 
heart of Government. As a result, the Plant Health Policy Team in Fera (which carries out 
much of the co-ordinating role) transferred to Defra on 31 December 2012.  
Fera implements plant health policy (a devolved matter) in England. The Welsh 
Government is responsible for plant health policy in Wales, but has a concordat with Fera 
and Defra in relation to plant health and seeds functions in Wales. Fera Inspectors carry 
out inspections of plants (including trees) and produce imported from non-EU countries, 
and targeted monitoring of plants (including trees) moving within the Single Market. Fera 
scientists carry out assessments of risk to plant health (other than forest trees), diagnosis 
of pests and pathogens, and research on risk assessment, detection, diagnosis and 
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control. A concordat signed in 2011 between Forestry Commission and Fera sets out the 
way the two organisations work together, including in outbreak situations.  
Pest or disease outbreaks are the joint responsibility of Fera and Forestry Commission 
with roles agreed based on where the sites are and what resources and capability are 
required to deal with the outbreak. Surveillance for harmful organisms of trees in the wider 
environment including street trees, public parks and gardens responsibility is shared 
between Forestry Commission (where there is a threat to forests or woodland), Fera, Local 
Authority tree officers, landowners and managers, and householders.  
Although the statutory plant health services have lead responsibility, a key element of the 
Tree Health and Plant Biosecurity Action Plan is the engagement of statutory conservation 
bodies, industry sectors, NGOs, local authorities, landowners and the public in reporting 
new pest and disease outbreaks and helping to manage them.  
The Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs has responsibility for 
forestry in England as well as certain activities such as international affairs, which are 
reserved. Responsibility for forestry in Scotland lies with the Scottish Government and in 
Wales with Welsh Ministers. Separate arrangements apply in Northern Ireland covered by 
the Plant Health Act (Northern Ireland) 1967. The Forestry Commission monitors forest 
tree health, at a national level, for quarantine pests. More generally, it monitors the 
condition of woodland trees as part of the National Forest Inventory (NFI) and through 
reports to the Tree Health Diagnostic and Advisory Service. 
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Annex F - Example template to assess impact and prioritise risks 
This example (provided by Professor Rob Fraser, School of Economics, University of Kent) illustrates how an overall pest risk prioritisation could be 
developed based on an assessment of economic, social and environmental impacts. Note that: (i) this example includes a simple estimate for the 
baseline risk which includes the likelihood of incursion, normally comprising of the probability of entry and the probability of establishment (see main 
text); (ii) the prioritisation presented in the table would need to take account of the cost and effectiveness of interventions to determine an action plan.  
 
Monetised Impacts 
Expected 
Cost 
Non‐monetised Expected Impacts 
 (based on Prob. Outbreak & size of impact)  
(Small/Med/Large) 
Overall Pest Risk Priority  
(Low/Med/High) 
Pest 
(A) 
Prob. 
Outbreak
(B) 
Economic 
(C) 
Social 
(D) 
Environmental
(E) 
(F) 
Based on 
B(C+D+E) 
Economic 
(G) 
Social 
(H) 
Environmental 
(I) 
(J) 
Based on F, G, H and I 
W  0.1 to 0.3  £100M  £50M  £50M  £20‐60M  Med  Med  Med  Med 
X  0.4 to 0.6  £70M  ££50M £0M  £48‐72M  Med  Large  Large  High 
Y  0.05  £200M  £0M  £100M  £15M  Med  Small  Small  Low 
Z  1  £0M  £15M  £15M  £30M  Small  Small  Small  Low 
 
Note: The overall priorities in column J are judgements that could change if different weights (importance) were attached to different criteria. Similarly, if the 
probabilities of an outbreak were revised, then this could change the prioritisation, and again if the estimates of monetised and non-monetised impact were to 
change then this could change the prioritisation. 
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Annex G – Tree Health: Examples of Current and Potential Pests and 
Pathogens 
 
The following table provides a summary of some key aspects of current and potential pests and pathogens of threat to the UK. Note that 
the table is illustrative and is not intended to be exhaustive neither in the coverage of organisms nor in the detail provided for each 
organism. The table however is indicative of the sorts of information that would be required to produce the Plant Health Risk Register 
initially for trees. 
Established Pest / Disease: Acute Oak Decline 
Organism(s) Complex of biotic factors - primarily bacteria and oak buprestid beetle Agrilus biguttatus, but abiotic factors may also play a role. 
Hosts UK native oak species, Quercus robur, Q. petraea 
Potential scale of damage  
Dieback and/or rapid mortality of infected native oaks. On average 25% of trees on an affected 
site symptomatic, over one year of monitoring 1% of trees died. Currently limited distribution, 
which coincides with known distribution of Agrilus biguttatus. 
Origin and current distribution 
Unknown but likely to be caused by resident organisms. Agrilus biguttatus is a native species 
and the bacterial species involved may also be native. Affected oak currently mainly south of 
the Wash. 
Means of spread Unknown: pruning, machinery and human transmission implicated. Also possible involvement of insects (including Agrilus biguttatus), birds or animals. 
EU Regulated organism [YES/NO] 
Control measures 
NO: research required so control advice is evidence based. In the interim, preventative 
measures (e.g. disinfect tools, destruction of infected material, containment of affected areas) is 
recommended. Also, raising of public and sector awareness through information and training. 
Control approaches being used in 
other countries Felling, but status of disorder uncertain elsewhere. 
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Established Pest / Disease: Acute Oak Decline 
Detection / Diagnostics 
Identification of micro-organism likely to be involved underway. Real-time Polymerase Chain 
Reaction (a DNA amplification method) detection of some of the bacteria involved under 
development. 
Knowledge gaps 
Causes of the condition: role played by organisms, host status, environmental conditions and 
effects of climate change.  
Epidemiology and transmission: extent and severity in Britain, rate of spread 
Control and management.  
Research is critical to determine these aspects so that management practises can be tested 
and implemented. A recent Defra grant (£1.1 million) will allow progress against several of 
these research gaps. 
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Established Pest / Disease: Bleeding Canker of Horse Chestnut 
Organism(s) Bacterial canker, Pseudomonas syringae pv aesculi (bacterium) 
Hosts Horse chestnut, Aesculus hippocastanum; also other Aesculus spp., particularly A. x carnea. 
Potential scale of damage 
Survey has revealed 33-79% horse chestnut trees affected by symptoms in England 
(depending on region), 36% in Wales and 42% in Scotland (2007 survey). Some trees remain 
completely unaffected suggesting resistance in horse chestnut population. 
Origin and current distribution Considered likely to originate from Himalayas causing low level damage to Aesculus.  Now known to be present in Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland and UK. 
Means of spread 
Long distance: planting material.  
Locally: rain splash dispersed and possibly through movement of contaminated machinery and 
soil/debris. 
EU Regulated organism [YES/NO] 
Control measures 
NO: no formal control measures (e.g. chemical treatments) available.  
Maintenance of affected trees to prevent safety hazards including pruning affected branches. 
Control approaches being used in 
other countries None. 
Detection / Diagnostics Real-time Polymerase Chain Reaction (a DNA amplification method), diagnostic developed. 
Knowledge gaps Pathways of spread into and within Europe, genetic processes facilitating infection of woody parts of the tree, spread and survival outside of the host. 
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Established Pest / Disease: Dothistroma Needle Blight 
NB. - Two pathogens can cause the disease, D. septosporum and D. pini; only the former is known to be present in GB. 
Organism(s) Dothistroma septosporum (fungus) 
Hosts Pine species; many other conifers are infected, but symptoms are mild. 
Potential scale of damage 
Most commercial pine species susceptible. Now found across Britain. Major loss of timber yield, 
increasing and rapid mortality being observed, particularly in Lodgepole pine. Reports on native 
Scots pine (including nurseries where fungicides applied) resulting in concerns not only for 
commercial forestry but also native Caledonian pine forests. 
Origin and current distribution 
Origin is unknown, although Himalayas and South America are possibilities. Disease is present 
in the Southern Hemisphere, but since the 1990s it has become widespread and common in the 
Northern Hemisphere including Europe (as far north as the Arctic circle). It has also had a major 
impact on pine in Canada since the 1990s. 
Means of spread Long distance: planting material and potentially seed lots contaminated with needle debris. Locally: rain and longer distances by wind-blown mists. 
EU Regulated organism [YES/NO] 
Control measures 
YES (Regulated in nurseries): destruction of infected planting stock. 
Use of alternative (resistant) species. Silvicultural practices, i.e. increased planting density, 
good weed control, thinning reducing humidity and inoculum can provide some benefit. Copper 
based fungicides in nurseries (not currently approved for use in the forest) suppress or prevent 
the disease but do not eradicate it if trees are already infected. 
Control approaches being used in 
other countries 
Similar control measures but a greater reliance on aerial spraying of copper fungicides (e.g. 
New Zealand). Some tree breeding also undertaken but the reduction in susceptibility is 
modest. Management methods are fairly well developed in New Zealand but large losses still 
occur e.g. approx.. £10 million per annum. 
Detection / Diagnostics 
Detection based on visual symptoms limited to June/July when fruit bodies and other symptoms 
most evident. Diagnosis well developed where fruit bodies are present, i.e. mainly June/July 
(both through microscopic analysis of spores and standard and real-time Polymerase Chain 
Reaction). Polymerase Chain Reaction methods available for mating type identification, with 
population studies using microsat and RAPD molecular markers. 
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Established Pest / Disease: Dothistroma Needle Blight 
NB. - Two pathogens can cause the disease, D. septosporum and D. pini; only the former is known to be present in GB. 
Knowledge gaps 
Diagnostics: extent on all susceptible commercial  species (including spruce, Douglas fir); 
severity and rate of change on above;  the potential for using aerial surveys/remote sensing;  
Improved monitoring and detection, particularly when fruit bodies are not present;  
presence/absence of D. pini and the sexual state of D. septosporum; Disease epidemiology 
including timing of spore dispersal, dispersal distances, spore persistence and critical loads, 
impacts of other environmental factors including climate change, relationship with other pests & 
pathogen; Economic, environmental and social impact including volume loses, mortality 
rates, rates of decay, timber properties, fire risk, ground nesting birds, recreation, health, 
Caledonian forest ecosystems. 
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Established Pest / Disease: Large pine weevil 
Organism(s) Hylobius abietis (weevil) 
Hosts Conifers 
Potential scale of damage Around 30% mortality of unprotected transplants in areas at risk. Nationwide risk in conifer plantation forestry. 
Origin and current distribution Widespread across Europe and Asia. 
Means of spread Predominantly by adult flight. Some potential for international spread in infested bark. 
EU Regulated organism [YES/NO] 
Control measures 
Yes: protection of conifer transplants using insecticides. Some potential for biocontrol with 
parasitic nematodes. Limited potential for use of physical barriers on transplants. Monitoring 
and management support system to minimise risk to transplants; fallow periods. 
Control approaches being used in 
other countries Insecticides. Scarification of planting sites and spray on physical barriers.. 
Detection / Diagnostics Larval populations in root stumps at clearfell sites. Feeding damage to stems of transplants. Transplant mortality. 
Knowledge gaps 
Impact of climate change on population dynamics and damage. Methods of improving 
transplant resistance. Variation in pathogenicity of nematodes and synergism with pathogenic 
fungi in biocontrol. 
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Established Pest / Disease: Great Spruce Bark Beetle 
Organism(s) Dendroctonus micans (beetle) 
Hosts Species of spruce 
Scale of damage / Commercial loss 
amenity /  Landscape (die back, 
reduced vigour, tree mortality) 
Significant mortality in infested stands. 
Origin and current distribution Origin: Eurasia, widely distributed on range of spruce species and occasionally on Scots pine. Invasive in Georgian Republic, Turkey and Great Britain, still spreading west in France. 
Means of spread 
Long distance: unbarked spruce logs/spruce bark from regions where native or established. 
Single females can establish.  
Local: movement of infested material. Natural spread by adult flight. 
EU Regulated organism [YES/NO] 
Control measures 
NO. biocontrol. Thinning to remove infested trees. Ireland has Protected Zone against this 
beetle and wood exports from UK must comply (debarking). Previous GB Protected Zone has 
been dropped. 
Control approaches being used in 
other countries Biocontrol with Rhizophagus grandis. Monitoring and destruction of infested trees. 
Detection / Diagnostics Resin bleeding/resin tubes on stem. Discolouration of foliage, especially top death. Tree mortality from repeated attacks. Galleries in bark. 
Knowledge gaps Influence of climate change on semi-voltine life cycle and damage. Potential to escape biocontrol as climate warms. 
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Newly arrived: Oak Processionary Moth 
Organism(s) Thaumetopoea processionea (moth) 
Hosts Wide range of oak species 
Potential scale of damage 
Affects oaks in urban areas and in woodlands and forests. Currently limited to urban areas in 
west London, a smaller outbreak in Berkshire and an outbreak in the London Boroughs of 
Bromley and Croydon. Capable of defoliating native oaks over several seasons, leading to 
dieback, long-term decline and mortality. Larval hairs cause severe health problems for people 
and animals (skin rash, eye and throat irritation, allergic reactions). Impact could be greater due 
to interaction with other biotic and abiotic factors associated with acute oak decline. 
Origin and current distribution 
Central and Southern Europe with periodic outbreaks in more northerly countries (e.g. Austria, 
Belgium, Netherlands). Invasive to GB and currently at very high levels in Belgium and 
Netherlands. 
Means of spread Long distance: on live plants-for-planting. Locally: natural dispersal by adult flight (up to 2km); transport on arboricultural arisings. 
EU Regulated organism [YES/NO] 
Control measures 
YES: emergency measures under Plant Health (Forestry) Order to prevent further importation 
on live plants and transport within UK. Application to EU for Protected Zone pending.  
Current: insecticide application from ground against young larvae (limited application against 
older larvae); removal of older larvae and larval nests by hand or vacuum equipment. Potential 
aerial application of Bacillus thuringiensis in non-urban woodlands. 
Control approaches being used in 
other countries 
EU as in UK but also insecticide application from the air (France, Germany).  
Trials with entomopathogenic nematodes currently being carried out in Netherlands. 
Detection / Diagnostics Pheromone trapping for adult moths, but traps inefficient. Visual surveys for eggs, larvae and nests. 
Knowledge gaps 
Life-cycle and biology under UK conditions, e.g. timing of egg hatch, oviposition and larval 
distribution in the canopy, dispersal distances. Climate relations: rate of development and 
population increase in relation to environmental temperatures. Natural controls: parasites, 
predators & pathogens. Monitoring & surveillance methods, especially factors limiting the 
effectiveness of pheromone traps. Interaction with other defoliators, pests and pathogens and 
impact on oak. 
 70 | Tree Health and Plant Biosecurity Expert Taskforce 
 
 
Newly arrived: Ramorum Disease (canker, dieback, leaf blight) 
Organism(s) Phytophthora ramorum (oomycete)  
Hosts Wide range including ornamentals, heathland plants, and a wide range of broadleaved and coniferous species. 
Potential scale of damage 
Larch: massive (landscape-level death). Fagaceae: minor (death/dieback). Heathland: major 
(death/dieback). Gardens: major (dieback/leaf blight). Hardy Ornamental Nursery Stock: 
moderate (dieback/leaf blight) 
Origin and current distribution 
Origin is unknown although Asia considered a strong possibility. Current distribution: 
widespread in Europe although mainly limited to ornamental plant nurseries and outlets with 
outbreaks in the wider environment in about 10 European countries including UK and Ireland. 
Also present in the wider environment in the USA (California & Oregon). 
Means of spread 
Long distance: planting material; soil. 
Locally: rain, wind-blown mists, via water courses, contaminated footwear, machinery, 
vehicles. 
EU Regulated organism [YES/NO] 
Control measures 
YES: current Phytophthora Disease Management Programme (PDMP) and EC measures (incl. 
plant passporting). Eradication and containment and management methods well developed (in 
heathland less so). Plant destruction. Fungicides well researched and slow-sand filtration. 
Disinfectants. Modelling in support of eradication and containment. 
Control approaches being used in 
other countries 
EU: as in UK.  
USA: similar to UK/EU. 
Detection / Diagnostics 
Well developed: Lateral Flow Device; in-field and lab-based Polymerase Chain Reaction; real-
time Polymerase Chain Reaction (in planta and for cultures) baits. Restriction Fragment Length 
Polymorphisms (a DNA-based diagnostic technique) to distinguish between the four lineages, 
as well as genotyping methods. 
Knowledge gaps 
Phytophthora Disease Management Programme (PDMP) having success, but step-
change in disease on larch (PDMP ends 2014). Research gaps:  Epidemiology on larch; 
impact of newly discovered EU2 lineage; potential impact on other forestry species. Remote 
sensing. Understanding and influencing behaviours. Host resistance (forestry species). 
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Newly arrived:  Kernoviae Disease (canker, dieback, leaf blight) 
Organism(s) Phytophthora kernoviae (oomycete) 
Hosts Wide including ornamental species principally rhododendron, pieris and magnolia. Also beech and heathland plants such as Vaccinium (billberry).  
Potential scale of damage Heathland: major (death/dieback). Trees: minor (some death/dieback). Gardens: major (dieback/leaf blight). HONS: minor (dieback/leaf blight). 
Origin and current distribution 
Likely to be New Zealand.  
Known distribution is UK (England, Scotland and Wales), Republic of Ireland, and New 
Zealand. 
Means of spread 
Long distance: planting material; soil.  
Locally: rain, wind-blown mists, via water courses, contaminated footwear, machinery, 
vehicles. 
EU Regulated organism [YES/NO] 
Control measures 
NO but regulated in the UK. Current Phytophthora Disease Management Programme. 
Eradication and containment and management methods well developed (in heathland less so). 
Plant destruction. Fungicides well researched and slow-sand filtration effective in nurseries. 
Disinfectants. 
Control approaches being used in 
other countries 
EU: as in UK. 
Detection / Diagnostics Well developed: Lateral Flow Device; in-field and lab-based Polymerase Chain Reaction; real time Polymerase Chain Reaction; baits. Limited genotyping methods. 
Knowledge gaps PDMP having success (ends 2014). Research gaps: Remote sensing. Epidemiology. Understanding and influencing behaviours. Host resistance (Vaccinium). 
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Newly arrived:  Lateralis Root Rot 
Organism(s) Phytophthora lateralis (Oomycete) 
Hosts Lawson cypress (Chamaecyparis lawsoniana) and other related species including …. 
Potential scale of damage Evidence suggests disease limited to Lawson’s cypress in the UK (little if any Pacific yew present), so impact major on ornamental plantings, nurseries; minor for forestry. 
Origin and current distribution 
Considered to be East Asia and has recently been discovered in Taiwan associated with native 
Chamaecyparis but with little/no impact, so likely area of origin. In Europe present in UK, 
France, Netherlands, Ireland. Also present in USA where it is highly damaging to native 
Chamaecyparis lawsoniana and Pacific yew. 
Means of spread 
Long distance: planting material; soil.  
Locally: via water courses, soil on machinery, footwear, possibly rain, wind-blown mists if aerial 
infection common. 
EU Regulated organism [YES/NO] 
Control measures 
YES (European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organisation A2) Current: destruction of 
infected plant material; nursery inspections; import controls. 
Control approaches being used in 
other countries 
Controls in place in USA to minimise movement in forests; development of resistant Lawson 
Cypress  genotypes. 
Detection / Diagnostics Well developed: lateral Flow Device; in-field and lab-based Polymerase Chain Reaction; baits. Microsat genotyping methods. 
Knowledge gaps Host range; pathway analysis; pathogen variation; risk mapping; epidemiology (particularly in relation to aerial infection); potential for hybridisation with P. ramorum (closest relative). 
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Probably newly arrived:  Pine Tree Lappet Moth 
Organism(s) Dendrolimus pini  (moth) 
Hosts Pines including Scots pine.  
Potential scale of damage 
Can cause extensive damage and tree death over large areas of forest in some countries, 
notably Poland and Germany and this frequently requires aerial insecticide application to 
control the outbreaks (but not regarded as a serious pest in some European countries). 
Origin and current distribution 
Northerly distribution in Western and Central Europe and European part of Russia.  
May be a new arrival in GB (Scotland) but molecular studies have, so far not ruled out the 
possibility that this is a hitherto unrecorded native species that has gone through a genetic 
bottleneck. 
Means of spread 
Long distance: planting material, forestry machinery from abroad, with wood products or wood 
packaging and deliberate releases cannot be ruled out.  
Locally: natural spread by adult flight; eggs and larvae could also be spread on harvested logs 
being transported on lorries or on plants or foliage. 
EU Regulated organism [YES/NO] 
Control measures 
NO. Current: not a regulated EU organism. In Scotland control is via movement restrictions 
within the outbreak area and application of biosecurity measures. 
Control approaches being used in 
other countries Considered a native elsewhere in Europe. 
Detection / Diagnostics 
Developing: Polymerase Chain Reaction based identification. Also, visual surveys for larvae 
and use of sticky bands to detect larvae moving down trunk to overwinter and up trunk in 
spring, annual light trapping for adult moths and pheromone trapping for adult male moths. 
Knowledge gaps 
Standardise survey techniques to monitor pine-tree lappet moth population’s  extent and size 
over time; phenology; DNA studies to try and clarify the origin of the Scottish moth (native or 
introduced); growth, consumption, and development rates of the caterpillars and adult fecundity. 
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Newly arrived:  Ash Die Back 
Organism(s) Chalara fraxinea (fungus) 
Hosts 
Common ash (Fraxinus excelsior) and narrow-leaved ash (F. angustifolia) severely affected; 
Manna ash (F. ornus) is a host but little dieback on this species. Asian ash species likely to be 
highly resistant; status North American ash species uncertain, but likely to be susceptible. 
Potential scale of damage Ash: potentially major; bark death, dieback and mortality. In northern Europe many ash stands are affected and death very widespread. 
Origin and current distribution Origin likely to be East Asia - has recently been reported in Japan. Now widespread across Europe (France to Ukraine and Russia). 
Means of spread 
Long distance: spread via movement of infected plant material and some evidence of longer 
distance spread by wind. 
Locally:  through wind-borne spores initiating infection on leaves. 
EU Regulated organism [YES/NO] 
Control measures 
NO. Recent ban imposed on imports of ash plants from other EC countries and on movement of 
trees from UK nurseries. Destruction of infected trees on nursery sites and containment 
strategy currently adopted at woodland/forest sites. 
Control approaches being used in 
other countries 
Very difficult to prevent spread once disease is established. The disease has spread rapidly in 
Europe. Preventative measures include sanitation, cultural methods, long term breeding 
strategy and chemical control. 
Detection / Diagnostics 
Well developed: both in planta (conventional and real-time Polymerase Chain Reaction) and 
for cultures (conventional and Polymerase Chain Reaction based). Lateral Flow Device in 
development. 
Knowledge gaps Detailed surveys of ash in the wider environment; nursery surveys; pathway analysis; epidemiology studies; host susceptibility. 
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Potential threats in EU: 8-toothed Europe Spruce Bark Beetle 
Organism(s) Ips typographus (beetle) 
Hosts Spruce 
Potential scale of damage 
Occasional landscape scale outbreaks and tree mortality in over mature forests following wind 
blow and/or pronged drought/high temperatures causing 'stress' on trees. Tree mortality along 
newly exposed forest edges. 
Origin and current distribution Widely distributed in Eurasia, including Japan. Intercepted frequently internationally, associated with wood plus bark. 
Means of spread Long distance: unbarked spruce logs/spruce bark from regions where native or established. Locally: infested logs, timber. Natural spread by adult flight. 
EU Regulated organism [YES/NO] 
Control measures 
YES. Keep out, knowledge of trade routes, awareness on nurseries, foresters, public. 
Current:  import controls, destruction of infested wood/lumber, port inspections/ pheromone 
traps to intercept beetles. Eradication attempt essential if local incursion. UK and Ireland have 
Protected Zones against this pest and 2 other European Ips species (I. amitinus and I. 
duplicatus). 
Control approaches being used in 
other countries 
Risk assessment in mature spruce forests. Monitoring with pheromone traps. Mass trapping 
has been used in large outbreaks. Prompt removal of trees following wind blow and forest 
hygiene. Felling and removal of infested trees before beetle emergence and destruction of 
infested bark. Pheromone trapping to detect any beetle populations. 
Detection / Diagnostics 
Pheromone traps at docks where spruce imported. Signs of infestation include resin bleeding 
on stem often with multiple attacks on same trunk. Discolouration of foliage and top death 
followed by full tree mortality. Distinctive galleries in bark. 
Knowledge gaps 
Life cycle on Sitka spruce in UK, especially ability of moribund host material to support endemic 
populations. Susceptibility/resistance of mature Sitka & Norway spruce. Pathogenicity of beetle 
associated fungi to Sitka spruce. Potential fungal associates that could already be present in 
GB. 
 
Potential threats in EU: Citrus Longhorned Beetle 
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Potential threats in EU: Citrus Longhorned Beetle 
Organism(s) Anoplophora chinensis (beetle) 
Hosts 
Wide range of broadleaved trees, especially maples (Acer species), chestnuts (Aesculus 
species), Citrus species., Hazel (Corylus species), Cotoneaster species, beech (Fagus 
species), figs (Ficus species), Hibiscus species, Lagerstroemia species), Mallotus species) crab 
apple (Malus species), plane (Platanus species), poplar (Populus species), cherry (Prunus 
species), pear (Pyrus species), willow (Salix species), rose (Rosa species), and elm (Ulmus 
species); also attacks Japanese red cedar (Cryptomeria japonica) 
Scale of damage / Commercial loss 
amenity /  Landscape (die back, 
reduced vigour, tree mortality) 
Die back of foliage during early attack phase. Sustained attacks can result in tree mortality. 
Origin and current distribution East Asia (China, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Burma, Vietnam). Current infestations in Italy (established), Netherlands, France, UK (all have records but now absent). 
Means of spread 
Long distance: spread via movement of infested living trees (especially Acer palmatum) and 
less commonly on wood packaging.  
Locally: adult flight over relatively short distances (up to 2 km). 
EU Regulated organism [YES/NO] 
Control measures 
YES. Control of movement of infested plants and wood to prevent long distance spread. 
Surveys around nurseries that have imported large numbers of maples or other host tree 
species from China or from already infested areas of Europe (e.g. Italy). Control of infestations 
by early detection and felling/destruction of infested trees. EU regulated pest (Annex I and II). 
Control approaches being used in 
other countries Felling of infested trees. Trunk injection with imidacloprid or thiamethoxam. 
Detection / Diagnostics 
Attacks usually near base of trunk of suitable hosts. First sign usually round exit hole. Small 
indentation from female chewing and oviposition and frass/wood shavings from larval activity 
are other external signs. Difficult to detect. 
Knowledge gaps 
Flight distances of adult beetles. Identification of potential natural enemies for possible classical 
biological control programmes. Early detection methods to be improved with increased 
discrimination between Citrus Long-horned Beetle and other species of longhorn and wood 
boring insects. 
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Potential threats in EU: Asian Longhorned Beetle 
Organism(s) Anoplophora glabripennis (beetle) 
Hosts Similar host range to citrus longhorn beetle (see above) and particularly sycamore and poplar.. 
Potential scale of damage Die back of foliage during early attack phase. Sustained attacks can result in tree mortality. 
Origin and current distribution 
China, Hong Kong, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea.  
Recorded or under eradication in Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, 
UK and USA. 
Means of spread 
Long distance: spread via movement of infested living or sawn wood, including wood-
packaging material (WPM), notably WPM that has been used to package stone and other 
heavy commodities such as machinery and wire spools. 
Locally: Adult flight over relatively short distances (up to 2 km). 
EU Regulated organism [YES/NO] 
Control measures 
YES. Control of movement of infested plants and wood (e.g. International Standards For 
Phytosanitary Measures 15) to prevent long distance spread. Control of infestations by early 
detection and felling/destruction of infested trees. EU regulated pest (Annex I and II). 
Control approaches being used in 
other countries Felling of infested trees. Trunk injection with imidacloprid or thiamethoxam. 
Detection / Diagnostics 
Attacks usually in the upper part of trunks of suitable hosts. First sign usually round exit hole. 
Small indentation from female chewing and oviposition and some evidence of larval frass/wood 
shavings during high density attacks are the only other external signs. Difficult to detect, 
particularly in the upper parts of the tree during low density attacks. 
Knowledge gaps 
Flight distances of adult beetles. Identification of potential natural enemies for possible classical 
biological control programmes. Early detection methods could be improved with increased 
discrimination from other species of longhorn and wood boring insects. 
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Potential threats in EU: Pine Processionary Moth 
Organism(s) Thaumetopoea pityocampa (moth) 
Hosts Pine, Atlas cedar (Cedrus atlantica), European larch (Larix decidua). 
Potential scale of damage 
Defoliates Pinus species in Mediterranean Europe. Moving northwards in France associated 
with climate change (now north of Paris and in Brittany and an outlier near Strasbourg). Larval 
urticating hairs cause human health problems. 
Origin and current distribution 
Albania, Algeria, Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, France (including Corsica), Greece 
(including Crete), Hungary, Italy (including Sardinia and Sicily), Libya, Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Morocco, Portugal, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain (including the Balearic Islands), Switzerland, Syria 
and Tunisia. 
Means of spread 
Long distance: spread via movement of pupae in the soil and larvae on foliage (overwintering 
stage within silken nests) with any trees (Pinus species and non-hosts) from areas where the 
pest is present. Locally: adults can fly a maximum of approximately 10 km. In France the 
average rate of spread with climate change is between 5 and 10 km per year. 
EU Regulated organism [YES/NO] 
Control measures 
NO. The species is not currently regulated in the EU. New regulations would be required to 
ensure that plants for planting from EU member states where the pest is present are free from 
the pest. 
Control approaches being used in 
other countries 
Trapping of adults and larvae, manual removal of nests, insecticide applications and biological 
control. 
Detection / Diagnostics Larval nests easy to detect. Adults attracted to pheromones and light. Pupae in the soil are very difficult to detect. 
Knowledge gaps 
The suitability of the climate for establishment in the UK is uncertain. Winter temperatures seem 
similar to those in Orleans where damage occurs but effects of UK winter solar radiation and 
late winter frost prevalence on pest needs further study. 
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Potential threats in EU: Pine Wood Nematode 
Organism(s) Bursaphelenchus xylophilus (nematode) 
Hosts Pinus species; most pines are host to the nematode, though North American pines are not damaged. 
Potential scale of damage 
Nematode lives in all species of conifer other than Thuja, Tsuga and Taxus. Massive loss of 
susceptible trees, especially pines, in areas where wilt expression occurs. Economic and 
environmental damage. However, since the Monochamus beetle vectors are absent from the 
UK, both the nematode and the beetle would need to enter and establish for outbreaks to occur. 
Origin and current distribution Canada, Mexico, USA, Current distribution, China, Hong Kong, Japan, N & S Korea, Portugal, Spain (eradicated) and Taiwan. 
Means of spread 
Long distance: spread via movement of infested living or sawn wood. Main risks are 
associated with presence of vector beetles in the genus Monochamus. 
Locally: adult beetle vectors fly over relatively short distances (up to 2 km), but could be longer 
distances. 
EU Regulated organism [YES/NO] 
Control measures 
YES. In areas where pine wilt expression occurs (linked to monthly isotherms >20oC and low 
soil moisture), early detection of wilt and felling of infested trees before emergence of vector 
beetles. Destruction or treatment of infested material to kill both nematode and vectors. The 
nematode can also be present in trees not showing wilt since the vector insect breeds in 
weakened or freshly killed trees and the nematode develops saptrophically. EU Regulated Pest, 
Annex I (along with its vectors in the genus Monochamus). 
Control approaches being used in 
other countries 
As above. There are no control measures applied in North America where the nematode is 
native and does not kill native trees other than occasionally in southern USA. 
Detection / Diagnostics 
In wilt areas, rapid loss of oleoresin pressure and reddening of foliage, followed by tree death. 
In non-wilt areas, sampling at the pupation sites of the vector Monochamus spp to detect 
nematodes. Nematodes can be extracted from infested trees to confirm diagnosis. 
Knowledge gaps 
Precise flight distances of adult beetles. Extent of likely wilt expression in Europe under current 
and future climates. Possible non-vector transmission. More accurate early detection of 
infestation. 
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Potential threats in EU: Pine Pitch Canker 
Organism(s) Gibberella circinata (fungus) 
Hosts Pinus species; Douglas fir (Pseudotsuga menziesii) 
Potential scale of damage Pine: potentially major; bark death causing girdling, dieback and mortality. Some trees show induced resistance after infection. 
Origin and current distribution 
Origin possibly southern North America (Mexico) or Central America. Distribution: North, 
Central and South America, South Africa, Haiti, Japan, South Korea. Europe: currently 
established in Spain and Portugal; recently found in France and Italy, but assumed eradicated. 
Means of spread Long distance: spread via movement of infected plant material and seed. Locally: insect spread with longer distances via wind, wind-blown rain. 
EU Regulated organism [YES/NO] 
Control measures 
Not known to be present in the UK. 
Treatments aimed at preventing entry: import controls and inspection, kiln drying of timber. 
Control approaches being used in 
other countries 
In EU and USA: Destruction of infected material; seed treatments; altered silviculture; selection 
of resistant pine species; sanitation of equipment. 
Detection / Diagnostics Well developed: both in planta (conventional and real-time Polymerase Chain Reaction) and for cultures (conventional and Polymerase Chain Reaction based). 
Knowledge gaps Risk mapping to determine areas at most risk (climate/host maps); susceptibility of key pine species under UK conditions; review of potential vectors; ring testing of diagnostic protocols 
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Potential threats in EU: Brown Spot Needle Blight 
Organism(s) Mycosphaerella dearnessi (fungus) 
Hosts Many pine species 
Potential scale of damage 
In North America it causes serious growth check to seedlings and young trees and has 
rendered Christmas tree plantations unsalable. It has recently been found affecting several pine 
species, including Scots pine, in a number of European countries e.g. Austria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Slovenia, Switzerland. 
Origin and current distribution Origin uncertain: first recorded in southern USA in 1920s. Currently present in North, Central and South America, central and eastern Europe, South Africa, Korea, China, Japan 
Means of spread 
Long distance: infected plant material and potentially seed lots contaminated with needle 
debris. 
Locally: rain splash, wind, insects and forestry equipment. 
EU Regulated organism [YES/NO] 
Control measures 
YES: not known to be present in the UK. 
 EC listed disease - import controls and inspection. 
Control approaches being used in 
other countries 
Silvicultural control i.e. burning to destroy infected needles,  use of resistant 
species/provenances, Fungicide control e.g. chlorothalonil and Bordeaux mixture, benomyl and 
maneb. 
Detection / Diagnostics Conventional and real-time Polymerase Chain Reaction. 
Knowledge gaps Pest risk analysis specific to GB; detection and diagnosis; risk mapping. 
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Potential threats in EU: Chestnut Blight 
Organism(s) Cryphonectria parasitica (fungus) 
Hosts 
Sweet chestnut (Castanea species); also other members of the Fagaceae: including oaks (the 
UK-native Q. robur and Q. petraea are susceptible); Castanopsis species. Reported hosts from 
other families include hickory (Carya ovata), maple (Acer) species and sumach (Rhus typhina). 
Symptoms are slight on species other than North American and European Castanea, although 
on these species, only small, superficial cankers are formed, and the damage is not serious. 
Potential scale of damage Potentially major: has largely eliminated chestnut from its native range in North America and is damaging to productive chestnut orchards in much of Europe. 
Origin and current distribution 
Origin Japan but introduced into North America in early 1900s, Europe in 1930s where it is now 
widespread. Recent incursions into England and Republic of Ireland - currently considered 
eradicated. 
Means of spread 
Long distance: spread via movement of infected plant material (plants, wood, bark) and birds. 
Small risk of transmission by fruits or seeds. 
Locally: insect spread, splash dispersal via rain. 
EU Regulated organism [YES/NO] 
Control measures 
YES: found on infected stock in the UK in 2011/12, plants destroyed; treatments aimed at 
preventing entry: import controls and inspection. 
Control approaches being used in 
other countries 
In EU and USA: destruction of infected material, use of hypovirulence where disease has 
established in Europe, sanitation of equipment. 
Detection / Diagnostics Conventional Polymerase Chain Reaction based method developed for in planta detection and authentication of isolates. Disease symptoms also very characterised and well described. 
Knowledge gaps Risk mapping to determine areas at most risk (climate/host maps), host testing; testing of diagnostic protocols. 
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Potential threats in EU: Zigzag Elm Sawfly 
Organism(s) Aproceros leucopoda (Hymenoptera, wasp) 
Hosts Elms (Ulmus species) 
Potential scale of damage 
Could potentially exacerbate impact of Dutch elm disease on what elms are left in UK. Larval 
feeding on leaves can cause severe defoliation in urban areas, along roadsides and in forests. 
In Romania individual trees have shown severe defoliation (up to 98%). Trees can produce a 
secondary bud burst but these leaves are also eaten causing twig and branch dieback. No tree 
mortality reported at present, but repeated defoliation over several years is likely to have an 
impact on tree vitality. 
Origin and current distribution 
Asia: China, Japan, Russia (Far East).  
Europe: Austria, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and 
Ukraine. 
Means of spread 
Long distance: by movements of infested twigs or shoots and young plants. Adult females are 
strong fliers in spring & summer. Cocoons can be formed on non-host goods close to infested 
trees. Infested goods can then be shipped and moved long distance with pupae as hitchhikers. 
Locally: air currents caused by traffic is also to be expected, since spread is observed along 
roads and highways. 
EU Regulated organism [YES/NO] 
Control measures 
NO. On the European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organisation Alert list as a potential 
emerging pest of forestry. 
Control approaches being used in 
other countries 
Has spread quickly in EU region. Control is difficult, insecticides (deltamethrin, teflubenzuron) 
have been found to be effective against the first and second instar larvae. Destroy infested 
plants. 
Detection / Diagnostics Could be detected by surveys. Conventional morphological keys have been developed to identify specimens. 
Knowledge gaps Factors likely to limit distribution. Much basic biology. If there are any EU natural enemies. 
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Potential threats in EU: Red Oak Borer 
Organism(s) Enaphalodes rufulus (beetle) 
Hosts Oaks and possibly other tree species; no data on susceptibility of European oak species. 
Potential scale of damage 
In USA during 1980s was estimated that 38% of oak wood used for lumber, cooperage and 
veneer was affected by E. rufulus, and could lead to 40% reduction of the tree value at the time 
of sawing. Normally tree mortality is not associated with E. rufulus infestations but in the early 
2000s severe mortality of red oaks (Q. rubra, Q. falcata and Q. velutina) was observed in the 
Ozark National Forest (Arkansas) and then in the nearby states of Oklahoma and Missouri. This 
severe oak mortality and decline which affected tens of thousands of oaks, primarily Q. rubra, 
was associated with an unprecedented outbreak of E. rufulus. Although there might be other 
factors involved (e.g. drought), E. rufulus was considered to be an important component of this 
severe oak tree decline. 
Origin and current distribution Native to North America, it occurs in the south-eastern part of Canada and the eastern part of the USA. No records of establishment in Europe - interception by UK in 2008. 
Means of spread 
Long distance: a previous unidentified pest finding from USA timber was highly suspected to 
be this pest. Hence trade of infested wood and wood products could provide a pathway for 
spread. 
Locally: adults can fly but data are lacking regarding spread rate. 
EU Regulated organism [YES/NO] 
Control measures 
NO. On the European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organisation Alert list as a potential 
emerging pest of forestry. 
Control approaches being used in 
other countries 
In forests, control measures are limited (removal of highly infested trees, general measures to 
encourage tree vigour); in parks and gardens, insecticide treatments can be applied for high 
value trees. 
Detection / Diagnostics Detection difficult (as for all wood boring beetles). Conventional morphological keys have been developed to identify specimens. 
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Potential threats in EU: Red Oak Borer 
Knowledge gaps 
No data regarding susceptibility of European oak species (e.g. Q. petraea, Q. pubescens, Q. 
robur). 
Hosts in USA include Quercus rubra (northern red oak), Q. velutina (black oak), Q. coccinea 
(scarlet oak). Other oak species are less commonly attacked, Q. alba (white oak), Q. stellata 
(post oak), Q. palustris (pin oak), Q. macrocarpa (bur oak), Q. lyrata (overcup oak), Q. laurifolia 
(laurel oak). 
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Potential threats in EU: Redneck Longhorn Beetle 
Organism(s) Aromia bungii (beetle) 
Hosts 
Wide host range on tress in several families. Mainly on cherry (Prunus species), particularly 
peach (P. persica) and apricot (P. armeniaca); also plum (P. domestica) and wild cherry (P. 
avium). Also found on neem (Azadirachta indica), bamboo (Bambusa textilis), American 
persimmon (Diospyros virginiana), European olive (Olea europea), white poplar (Populus alba), 
wingnuts (Pterocarya species), pomegranite (Punica granatum). 
Potential scale of damage Reduces yield from fruit trees such as plum, cherry, peach, apricot.  Damages other hardwood trees such as Poplar. 
Origin and current distribution 
Asia: China (present throughout China but more prevalent in the central and northern 
provinces), Korea (Republic of), Korea (Peoples’ Democratic Republic of), Mongolia, Taiwan, 
Vietnam. 
Present in Germany and Italy but under eradication. UK and USA interceptions in 2008. 
Means of spread Found in UK with wooden pallets from China in 2008. However, pest is not known to have established in UK. 
EU Regulated organism [YES/NO] 
Control measures 
NO. On the European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organisation Alert list as a potential 
emerging pest of forestry. 
Strict application of International Standards For Phytosanitary Measures 15 (control of Woody 
Packaging Material) will kill larvae in timber. 
Control approaches being used in 
other countries 
International Standards For Phytosanitary Measures 15 is recommended almost globally (all 
IPPC contracting parties). 
Detection / Diagnostics No formal surveys known. Found through public reporting. 
Knowledge gaps Big knowledge gaps on general biology - little is published in its native China. 
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Other threats globally: Spruce Budworm 
Organism(s) Choristoneura fumiferana (moth) 
Hosts Mainly spruce (Picea) and true fir (Abies) species, but also on Doulgas fir (Pseudotsuga menziesii), Pinus spp and Tsuga and Larix.  
Potential scale of damage 
It especially attacks Abies balsamea, Picea glauca and P. rubens in eastern North America and 
A. lasiocarpa, P. engelmannii, P. glauca and Pseudotsuga menziesii in the West. Periodic very 
large outbreaks causing severe defoliation and occasional tree mortality throughout range in 
North America. 
Origin and current distribution North America (Canada and USA). No records in Europe or outside native range. 
Means of spread Long distance: possible spread via movement of infested plant material (plants or cut foliage). Locally: adult flight or 'ballooning' of early larval stages on air currents. 
EU Regulated organism [YES/NO] 
Control measures 
YES: prohibition of the import of plants and cut foliage of Abies, Larix, Picea, Pinus and 
Pseudotsuga from infested countries, as recommended by European and Mediterranean Plant 
Protection Organisation for other North American insect pests of conifers. EU Regulated Pest 
(Annex I). 
Control approaches being used in 
other countries 
Aerial application of insecticides (mainly Bacillus thuringiensis) is the most commonly used 
method against C. fumiferana. However, natural enemies (e.g. Apanteles fumiferanae, 
Omotoma fumiferanae) can limit populations of the pest and inundative releases of 
Trichogramma minutum have been made. Sex pheromones are under investigation for trapping 
and mating disruption. 
Detection / Diagnostics Defoliation and presence of larvae and associated silken threads. 
Knowledge gaps Potential for damage in Europe extrapolated from widespread planting of suitable host tree species. No direct knowledge of impacts and no known interceptions. 
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Other threats globally: Sweet Chestnut Gall Wasp 
Organism(s) Dryocosmus kuriphilus (Hymenoptera: Cynipidae - gall wasp) 
Hosts The gall wasp attacks Castanea crenata, C. dentata, C. mollissima, C. sativa and their hybrids. 
Potential scale of damage Extensive damage to chestnut production (60-70% losses have been recorded). The species poses the greatest threat to chestnuts in southern Europe. 
Origin and current distribution 
Asia: China, Japan, Korea. 
Present in North America - Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee and 
Virginia.  
Europe: Croatia, France, Italy, Slovenia, Switzerland. 
Means of spread 
Long distance: plants for planting and cut branches of Castanea (young chestnut plants or cut 
branches with buds moving in trade can contain eggs or first instar larvae within buds). 
Locally: adult females disperse between trees. The species is parthenogenetic (female only). 
EU Regulated organism [YES/NO] 
Control measures 
NO: prohibition of movement of infested plants or cut branches of sweet chestnut (Castanea 
species). 
Removal of infested branches (low infestation) or whole trees (high infestation). 
European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organisation A2 listed but not EU regulated. 
Control approaches being used in 
other countries 
Direct removal of infested chestnuts carried out in China. Not regarded as practical in EU and 
European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organisation region. 
Detection / Diagnostics Damage to development and to fruit, with signs of characteristic gall development. 
Knowledge gaps Natural enemies under European conditions where the wasp has already established, e.g. Italy. 
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Other threats globally: Emerald Ash Borer 
Organism(s) Agrilus planipennis (beetle) 
Hosts North American ash species susceptible. European ash species are susceptible. Asian ash species are tolerant. 
Potential scale of damage High mortality expected if borer becomes established with major economic and environmental impacts. 
Origin and current distribution 
Asia; China, Japan, Korea (DPR), Korea (Republic), Russian Far East, Taiwan. 
Canada, USA (Eastern and Central).  
Europe: Russia (Moscow region). 
Means of spread 
Long distance: via live ash trees imported for planting, potentially also in woodchips and wood 
for bioenergy (increasing), wood products, especially with bark. Risk of hitch-hiking on vehicles 
from Moscow area to EU. 
Locally: natural dispersal (adults are strong fliers); human assisted movement in wood 
products e.g. firewood. 
EU Regulated organism [YES/NO] 
Control measures 
YES: not present in UK. No successful control measures once established. EU regulated pest. 
Import controls to prevent entry. 
Control approaches being used in 
other countries 
EU import controls on live ash trees and wood; new (2011) regulations on wood fuel, including 
minimum size of wood chips, heat treatment, compliance with International Standards For 
Phytosanitary Measures 15 protocols. Injections with emamectin benzoate. 
Detection / Diagnostics 
Early detection difficult. Larval feeding on inner bark leading to girdling and leaf yellowing and 
branch dieback. Tree mortality usually within a few years. Characteristic D-shaped exit holes 
but only once adults have left. 
Knowledge gaps 
In early 2013, known to be 250 km west of Moscow and spreading at approximately 20 km per 
year. No current intensive survey or direct control measures in Russia. Further information 
needed on situation in Russia, especially on the quantities of ash material moved along internal 
and international pathways. 
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Other threats globally: Bronze Birch Borer 
Organism(s) Agrilus anxius (beetle) 
Hosts European and Asian species of birch 
Potential scale of damage 
Birch spp. are highly susceptible and have been widely killed in North America. High mortality of 
European birch expected if A.anxius becomes established with major economic and 
environmental impacts 
Origin and current distribution Canada and USA. Absent in EU and European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organisation region. 
Means of spread 
Long distance: via woodchips and wood for bioenergy (increasing), live plant material, or wood 
products, especially with bark. 
Locally: natural dispersal (adults are strong fliers); human assisted movement in wood 
products e.g. firewood. 
EU Regulated organism [YES/NO] 
Control measures 
YES. European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organisation A1 list. Not present in UK. No 
successful control measures once established. 
EU importation controls to be put in place for birch products from North America. 
Control approaches being used in 
other countries 
European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organisation Pest Risk Analysis recently 
completed; import controls to be established for birch products from North America, including 
minimum size of wood chips, heat treatment of wood products & importation of small plants 
only. 
Detection / Diagnostics 
Early detection difficult. Larval feeding on inner bark leading to girdling and leaf yellowing and 
branch dieback. Possible swellings where tree has healed, tree mortality usually within a few 
years. Characteristic D-shaped exit holes but only once adults have left. 
Knowledge gaps Uncertainty regarding the quantities of material and birch species moved along international pathways. Susceptibility of some European birch species unknown. 
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Other threats globally: Oak Wilt 
Organism(s) Ceratocystis fagacearum (fungus) 
Hosts 
Oak species. Red oak group (subgenus Erythrobalanus) is highly susceptible, white oaks 
(subgenus Lepidobalanus including Europea oak species) take many years to die, but dieback 
may be obvious and serious. 
Potential scale of damage 
Potentially major: native European oaks have been shown to be susceptible to this pathogen 
and Europe also has a native oak bark beetle Scolytus intricatus, which may be more effective 
at spreading the pathogen than North American vectors. 
Origin and current distribution Indigenous to eastern and mid-western states of North America. Not known elsewhere. 
Means of spread 
Long distance: spread via movement of infected logs and lumber. 
Locally: insect spread (nititulid beetles and bark beetles), root transmission via natural root 
grafts. 
EU Regulated organism [YES/NO] 
Control measures 
YES. European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organisation A1 list. Not known to be 
present in the UK; treatments aimed at preventing entry: import controls and inspection; 
treatment of oak logs/lumber from North America. 
Control approaches being used in 
other countries 
In the USA: Early detection and prompt removal of dead or dying trees; severing root grafts 
between diseased and healthy trees. Minimising bark damage to trees when insect vectors 
most likely to transmit the pathogen. 
Detection / Diagnostics 
Nested and real-time Polymerase Chain Reaction assay recently developed, capable of 
detecting pathogen in artificially infected wood and soil. Fungal morphology and disease 
symptoms also very characteristic and well described. 
Knowledge gaps Review of pest risk analysis; testing of diagnostic protocols. 
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Other threats globally: Plane Wilt 
Organism(s) Ceratocystis platani (fungus) 
Hosts Plane (Platanus species). Oriental and hybrid (London) plane very susceptible. 
Potential scale of damage 
Very damaging to Platanus (up to 80% of trees affected in some parts of France). Oriental 
plane (Platanus orientalis) in its native range in Greece is very badly affected. Impact in UK will 
be to the abundant Platanus used as street trees in urban areas. 
Origin and current distribution Probably native to North America but introduced to Italy, Greece, France, Switzerland. Single interception in Spain. Single report from Belgium unconfirmed. 
Means of spread 
Long distance: spread via movement of infected plants, logs and lumber. 
Locally: infested soil; transmission via natural root grafts, water courses (fragments of infected 
material), insect transmission. 
EU Regulated organism [YES/NO] 
Control measures 
NO. Not known to be present in the UK but movement of Platanus plants/timber from affected 
EU member states not currently regulated. 
Control approaches being used in 
other countries 
Europe/USA: Early detection and prompt removal of dead or dying trees; severing root grafts 
between diseased and healthy trees; disinfection of pruning tools; control on movement of earth 
on infected sites. 
Detection / Diagnostics Fungal morphology and disease symptoms well described. Routine Polymerase Chain Reaction based and real-time diagnostic methods not developed. 
Knowledge gaps Pathway analysis; review of pest risk analysis; development of molecular diagnostic protocols. 
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Annex H – Border Controls 
The EU’s plant health rules are currently being revised, and formal proposals are expected 
from the European Commission in May 2013. It is not only in the UK that threats to plant 
health are causing increasing concern. A number of plant pests and pathogens have 
arrived in Europe in recent years, spreading and causing serious damage to trees and 
crops. Red palm weevil (Rhynchophorus ferrugineus), pinewood nematode 
(Bursaphelenchus xylophilus) and maize borer (Diabrotica virgifera) are among the most 
prominent examples. Increased awareness of this damage, and the threat of further such 
introductions, has led to calls for a review of the ways in which plant health risks are 
managed across Europe. The main elements and concepts of the EU Plant Health 
Directive had been developed before the establishment of the internal market in 1993, the 
present version was consolidated in 2000.  
The key UK objectives for a new regime, developed in consultation with UK stakeholders 
over the last four years, have been: 
• faster decision making, so that measures are put in place before new pests and 
pathogens arrive in Europe; 
• management better targeted and proportionate to risks, including regionalisation 
where justified by differences of risk, and a shift of emphasis from lower risk plant 
produce to higher risk plants for planting; and 
• more collaboration between plant health inspectorates across Europe. 
A study evaluating the current regime, funded by the European Commission, is available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/plant_health_biosafety/rules/index_en.htm. Its 
conclusions are in line with the UK analysis. In particular, it found that the main problems 
with the current regime are: 
• insufficient focus on prevention in relation to increased imports of high risk 
commodities; 
• a need for prioritising harmful organisms at EU level across all Member States; 
• a need for better measures for controlling the presence and natural spread of 
harmful organisms that manage to enter the Union territory; and 
• a need for modernising and upgrading the measures concerning the phytosanitary 
control of intra-EU movements (plant passports and protected zones). 
Since the evaluation was published, the Commission has continued informal consultation 
in the framework of meetings of the Member States “Chief Plant Health Officers” and a 
series of task forces to aid the Commission’s thinking in drafting proposals on different 
 94 | Tree Health and Plant Biosecurity Expert Taskforce 
 
aspects of the regime. Major elements that remain to be resolved and are likely to feature 
in the negotiations once the proposals are published include: 
• cost and responsibility sharing between the EU, Member States and industry 
sectors; 
• compensation for eradication action against outbreaks; and 
• whether to reverse the burden of proof so that new trades in plants must be 
assessed for risk before they are allowed to develop (the so-called “reverse 
strategy”).  
The legislative proposals could take up to two years to negotiate. As a result of the Lisbon 
Treaty, and for the first time in relation to plant health legislation, the European Parliament 
will be involved in negotiations. A similar period will be allowed for the Member States to 
implement the new rules. However, the new European plant health strategy needs to cover 
not just legislation but also co-ordination of research, collection and sharing of information, 
development of IT systems for import controls, contingency planning, training of plant 
health inspectors, and influencing and using the international standards developed under 
the International Plant Protection Convention. Many of those elements can be taken 
forward in advance of the legislation taking effect. 
EU proposals and the Taskforce Recommendations 
The Taskforce has considered the EU proposals and recognises that the current review 
offers a clear opportunity to improve European plant health rules in the directions that the 
taskforce is recommending. In particular, the Taskforce notes the following ways in which 
its recommendations may be advanced through the review. 
Develop a prioritised UK Plant Health Risk Register  
The draft Commission proposals require establishment of a “priority list” of harmful 
organisms for the EU,  to comprise not more than 10% of the current long list of some 250 
organisms listed in the annexes of the Plant Health Directive. These priority organisms 
would be the subject of mandatory surveillance, contingency planning and eradication of 
outbreaks, with the possibility of EU co-funding. The Taskforce notes that although there is 
a helpful parallel with the prioritisation they have recommended for the UK, the priority 
organisms will not all be the same for the UK and for other Member States. The Taskforce 
proposes that the proposals be closely examined to ensure that sufficient regionalisation 
will be available to ensure that risks from organisms that are a priority to the UK, but not to 
all other Member States, can be effectively managed. The Taskforce recognises that this 
will also allow other Member States with specific plant health risks to take measures to 
manage those risks, provided they are technically justified. 
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The draft Commission proposals do not make clear how the Commission is going to speed 
up decision making to ensure that pest risks identified through horizon scanning by the 
European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organisation (EPPO), the European Food 
Safety Authority (EFSA) or other international networks, are rapidly assessed and, where 
appropriate, regulated. The Taskforce proposes that the UK press the Commission for 
further information about their plans in this respect, and notes that progress on decision 
making does not need to await legislative changes. 
If decision making is slowed by lack of resources in the Commission, the Commission 
should consider the appropriate balance of staff resources between animal health and 
plant health. 
Improve the use of epidemiological intelligence from EU/other regions 
The Taskforce proposes increased support for the horizon scanning work of EPPO and 
EFSA. The Taskforce proposes that the UK seeks clarification of the obligation in the draft 
Commission proposal on Member States to notify suspected presence of new pests and 
pathogens that are not yet listed. It also proposes that the UK seeks assurance that the 
Commission will apply sanctions to those Member States that fail to disclose information 
about outbreaks in a reasonable time. The Taskforce welcomes the potential for the EU 
and Member States to gather more detailed, accurate and comprehensive information on 
plant imports through the TRACES74 system. 
Develop and implement procedures for preparedness and contingency 
planning to predict, monitor and control the spread of pests and 
pathogens 
The Taskforce welcomes the emphasis in the draft Commission proposals on systematic 
surveillance, contingency planning and exercises for priority pests and pathogens. The 
Taskforce proposes that European capability in epidemiological modelling be used to 
inform contingency planning and survey design, and that information and plans are shared 
to make best use of information from across Europe. 
Develop a modern, user-friendly system to provide quick and intelligent 
access to information about tree health and plant biosecurity 
The Taskforce proposes that information and communication systems be given a high 
priority in the development of a Europe wide plant health strategy, recognising the benefit 
of pooling information from as wide a range of sources as possible. The Taskforce 
                                            
74 The EU system for recording and tracking imports, exports and EU movements of animals and animal 
products, including links to Customs processes. 
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recognises the importance of EPPO as the major European repository of tree health and 
plant biosecurity information, and the major user of such information for horizon scanning 
purposes. 
Strengthen biosecurity to reduce risks at the border and within the UK 
a) Imports from non-EU countries 
The Taskforce strongly supports a shift towards a “reverse strategy” whereby risks from 
new trades in plants are assessed before the trade is allowed to develop. Without such a 
shift in the burden of proof it is difficult to see how the EU regime can be effective in 
guarding against new and emerging risks. The current draft proposal of the Commission 
addresses new risks from plants for planting without really incorporating the necessary 
elements of such an approach. The Taskforce notes that this approach is common in other 
countries around the world, and is also a key part of the EU approach to import controls to 
protect animal health. Existing trade should also be reviewed periodically to establish 
where any new risks may be arising from changes occurring in production systems. 
The Taskforce welcomes the Commission’s proposals to apply the TRACES system (see 
also above) to imports of plants and plant produce, to enable more data to be gathered on 
imports, which can be compared with the records of interceptions and thereby be used to 
target new risks and intensify and focus inspection efforts. 
The Taskforce supports the removal of the passenger baggage concession which currently 
allows Member States to set aside plant health rules on small quantities of plants and plant 
produce in passengers’ baggage. Removal of the concession, and application to 
passengers of the same rules that apply to commercial imports, would not only be more 
secure and more equitable, but would make it easier to publicise and enforce controls. 
 
The ability for Member States to take effective emergency action against new threats on a 
precautionary basis ahead of formal risk assessment must remain a key part of the control 
system. 
b) Movement of plants and produce within the EU 
The Taskforce welcomes the proposal to extend plant passporting to all genera of plants 
for planting through to the last commercial buyer. The lack of plant passporting for ash 
trees was a significant barrier to gathering intelligence on the risks from Chalara fraxinea 
and to tracing deliveries once the risks were understood. The Task Force also welcomes 
UK moves to require notification of deliveries into the UK of certain high risk plants, so that 
compliance with the plant passporting rules can be checked. 
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Address key skills shortages 
The Taskforce proposes that as part of the new plant health strategy, key skills shortages 
should be addressed on a Europe wide basis. Training and development of relevant 
expertise in traditional taxonomy, molecular diagnostics, epidemiology, and inspectorate 
skills should be planned collaboratively between European countries. The European 
Commission should play a role in retaining expertise which is essential to delivery of the 
EU plant health regime. 
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